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Technology, the Changing Nature of Disputes,




There are a number of legitimate reasons to be excited about the application of
new technologies to make contracting more efficient. Unfortunately, each of those
reasons is associated with certain risks for both contractors and contractees. In this
article, I argue that an ‘‘equitable” approach to modern contract law — understood
by the likes of Larry DiMatteo and others ‘‘not merely as a system of rules, but of
rules tempered by standards and principles” — is particularly well suited for
counterbalancing some of the undesirable contractual risks introduced by new
technologies like blockchain, artificial intelligence, and smart contracts. A
historical analysis of Canada’s common law treatment of equity suggests that
new technologies — particularly those that encroach on human autonomy in the
contracting process — may push decision makers to increasingly draw on equitable
analyses in contractual disputes. I propose that Canadian contract law can expect
broader and more principled statutory rules and common law tests, the more that
human autonomy is removed from the contracting process by technologies like
blockchain, artificial intelligence, and smart contracts. Accordingly, I outline four
proposals for counterbalancing the undesirable contractual risks that could be
introduced by these new technologies: (1) inserting equitable principles into
statutes to (a) prohibit the use of unilateral amendment provisions in consumer
contracts, (b) prohibit the communication of terms and conditions after contract
formation, (c) prohibit the use of waivers to block consumers from bringing class
action proceedings, and (d) prohibit self-executory performance clauses in
consumer contracts without constructive notice; (2) embracing generalist
equitable statutes not limited to special forms of contracts; (3) making
legislative reform quicker and more adaptable to technological change; and (4)
promoting technical literacy and a deeper, bona fide study of equitable reasoning
and principles in law school and professional curricula.
* B.C.L. & LL.B. graduate, McGill University’s Faculty of Law, and Articling Student
with Gowling WLG LLP (Canada). I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the
entire team at theCanadian Journal of Law and Technology, and to all the reviewers who
offered valuable feedback on this submission. Your hard work and expert insights were
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three years. I am truly grateful for all the times he met with me to discuss my research,
offereddetailed feedbackonmyprogress, and encouragedme tackle challenging issues in
the law. I want to sincerely thank him for agreeing to supervisemy research while I was a
student at McGill.
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[T]he law provides just one among many stories of justice. If the law
story is to convince us, it must include the character of equity. Without
equity, the law’s story becomes all rules and no justice.
— Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law
(Portland: Hart, 2009) at 45.
The great advantage of ancient principles of equity is their flexibility:
the judiciary is thus able to shape these malleable principles so as to
accommodate the changing needs and mores of society, in order to
achieve justice
— Justice Dickson, Becker v. Pettkus, 1980 CarswellOnt 299, 1980
CarswellOnt 644, (sub nom. Pettkus v. Becker) [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834
(S.C.C.) at para. 37.
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of equity in modern contract law is a polarizing subject. Some,
according to Lionel Smith of McGill University, can be described as equity
pragmatists, ‘‘see[ing] the legacy of equity as an historical fact that merely
complicates the correct understanding of the modern law.”1 While others can be
described as equity purists, who believe in the ‘‘continuing distinctness of
equitable reasoning, equitable doctrines, [and] equitable traditions.”2 As
observed by Smith, ‘‘[t]hese groups rarely see eye to eye,”3 which explains why
1 ‘‘Unravelling Proprietary Restitution” (2004) 40:3 Can. Buss. L.J. 317 at 317 [Smith,
‘‘Unravelling”]. See also Foster Calhoun Johnson, ‘‘JudicialMagic: The Use of Dicta as
Equitable Remedy” (2012) 46:1 U.S.F. L. Rev. 883 at 936 (‘‘We have no good reason to
believe that judges are in a better position to evaluate policy than democratically elected
legislatures. Neither do we have reason to believe that courts would function freed from
the normal requirements of stare decisis. If judges were free to ignore precedent or the
law, then the lawwouldbenothing than thewill of judges”) citingRichardA.Posner,The
Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 21
(‘‘judicial discretion is, no matter how fancied up, a source of unease to the legal
profession”); Henry E. Smith, ‘‘The Equitable Dimension of Contract” (2012) 45:1
SuffolkU.L. Rev. 897 at 897 (‘‘Equity is treated either with disdain as useless moralizing
or with impatience as a mere proto-version of freewheeling contextualized inquiry that
the law court should be engaging in without artificial constraints of a separate ‘equity.’
Whether they have been anti-moralists, formalists, realists, or consequentialists,
commentators have been quite unified in their preference for contract law over equity”)
[Smith, ‘‘Equitable Dimension”].
2 Smith, ‘‘Unravelling,” supra note 1 at 317. See also Larry A. DiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’s
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reforma-
tion of Contract” (1999) 33:2 New. Eng. L. Rev. 265 at 268 (‘‘The twentieth century’s
swing toward imposing community values of fairness and justice has resulted in the
equitable reformation of contracts”) citingRoscoePound, Introduction to thePhilosophy
of Law, 2ed (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1959) at 77 [Pound, Philosophy of Law]
(‘‘RoscoePound saw the lawmoving naturally fromone of strict formality to one infused
with equitable principles”); Lionel Smith, ‘‘Access to Trust Information: Schmidt v.
RosewoodTrust Ltd” (2003) 23:1 E.P.T.J. 1 at 6-7 (‘‘The equity pragmatist would like to
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Smith — and others like Leonard Rotman, characterize the modern role of
equity as ‘‘contentious” and ‘‘a matter of significant debate and confusion.”4
Whether you consider yourself an equity pragmatist or equity purist — probably
subscribing to a middle ground between both ends of this continuum —
technological developments in contract automation and standardization over the
last four decades raise new and practical questions about the role of equitable
reasoning in modern contract law. At the outset, I wish to make it clear that I
associate more closely with the purist position, while nonetheless understanding
and appreciating the fact that law and equity are formally merged under
Canadian contract law.5 This ideological position is consistent with Rotman and
others, who believe that ‘‘equity ought to be understood to have a continuing and
substantive role in contemporary law and legal education.”6 Gary Watt adds:
We do not mourn the passing of the old Court of Chancery with all the
evils it perpetuated... but we should not make the mistake of sealing its
treasure in the tomb. The treasure of the chancery is a living language; a
eliminate discretion the legacy of discretion in equitable matters, but Schmidt and other
cases suggest that this is not about to happen”).
3 Smith, ‘‘Unravelling,” supra note 1 at 317-18. See also Smith, ‘‘Equitable Dimension,”
supra note 1 at 897.
4 Leonard I. Rotman, ‘‘The ‘Fusion’ of Law and Equity?: A Canadian Perspective on the
Substantive, Jurisdictional, or Non-Fusion of Legal and Equitable Matters” (2016) 2:2
Can. J. Comparative & Contemporary L. 497 at 507 [Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law and
Equity”]. See also Smith, ‘‘Unravelling,” supra note 1 at 317-318.
5 SeeSupremeCourt of Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), 36& 37Vict, c. 66. For a discussion of
how law and equity came together in Canada following the Supreme Court of Judicature
Act, see also Linda A. Taylor & David M. Wood, ‘‘Equitable Jurisdiction of the
Provincial Court of Alberta” (1997) 35:3 Alta. L. Rev. 592 at 597-602.
6 Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law andEquity,” supra note 4 at 501 (‘‘Equity is not only amethod
bywhich the rigours of the common laware tempered and its gaps filled, nor is itmerely a
competing system to thepositive law.Rather, equity ismore appropriatelyunderstoodas
a process by which positive law is brought closer to the human condition”). See also
Fiona Burns, ‘‘The ‘Fusion Fallacy’ Revisited” (1993) 5:2 BondL.Rev. 152 at 178 (‘‘It is
submitted that we are at an intermediate stage of development where substantive fusion
is still limited and prospective”); Peter Bowal, ‘‘Equity: The Lawof Judicial Conscience”
(2008) 32:5 LawNow 1 at 2 (‘‘an unwavering focus on fixed rules can itself lead to
injustice in some cases. As with most systems with fixed rules... exceptions need to be
made occasionally, in the interest of justice. The strictness of legal rules, applied in every
case,must beoffset by some flexibility to ensure greater fairness. This objective of general
predictability and efficiency (common law) co-exists along side the objective of
individual discretion and flexibility to facilitate justice in special cases (equity)”);
Donovan W.M. Waters, ‘‘The Reception of Equity in the Supreme Court of Canada
(1875-2000)” (2001) 80:1 Can. Bar Rev. 620 at 698 (‘‘Once a relative backwater of rules
originated elsewhere, [equity] is now deliberately used as an instrument to turn the flank
or fill the silences of accepted common law doctrine and to produce contemporary
assessments of obligation breach and appropriate response”) [Waters, ‘‘The Reception
of Equity”].
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vital repository of checks and balances that maintain the law’s just
operation in the zone between too much rigour and too much
flexibility... Chancery language still has the capacity to inform the art
of bending the rules without breaking them and the capacity to reform
the law without deforming it.7
My position assumes that equitable principles remain infused in both
common law and statutory duties today, and that — as advanced by Jeff
Berryman — ‘‘references to equity in Canada are more than rhetorical flourishes;
equity together with conscience connotes a distinct form of reasoning.”8 It also
assumes that the application and consideration of equitable principles by
Canadian courts is subject to change, particularly because — as noted by the
Supreme Court in Pro Swing Inc. v. ELTA Golf Inc. — ‘‘[t]he application of
equitable principles is largely dependent on the social fabric.”9 Indeed, as
observed by Roscoe Pound, and reiterated more recently by Larry DiMatteo,
‘‘[t]he counterpoise of law and equity [is] cyclical in nature... [because of] an
ongoing oscillation between the strictness of law and equity’s response to the
injustices produced by the strict application of that law.”10
At the heart of this research are two questions. Taking for granted equity’s
cyclical nature and the historic oscillation between strictness and discretion in
contract law,11 have technological developments in contract automation and
standardization over the last four decades had an impact on the nature or
frequency of equitable principles considered by Canadian courts? If so, what can
7 Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Oxford, UK: Hart, 2009) at 131
[emphasis added].
8 Jeff Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims as a Concept in Canadian Jurisprudence” (2011) 43:2
Ottawa L. Rev. 165 at 181 [Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims”]. See also GeorgeWKeeton,
An Introduction toEquity, 6th ed (London,U.K.: Pitman, 1956) at 43-44 (‘‘the distinction
between common law and equity is not only one of history, but also one of attitude”).
9 Pro Swing Inc. v. ELTA Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, 2006 CarswellOnt 7203, 2006
CarswellOnt 7204 (S.C.C.) at para. 22,Deschamps J. [Pro Swing] citing I. C. F. Spry, The
Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and
Equitable Damages, 6th ed. (Pyrmont, N.S.W.: LBC Information Services, 2001) at 6
(‘‘the maxims of equity are of significance, for they reflect the ethical quality of the body
of principles that has tended not somuch to the formation of fixed and immutable rules,
as rather to a determination of the conscionability or justice of the behaviour of the
parties according to recognised moral principles. This ethical quality remains, and its
presence explains to a large extent the adoption by courts of equity”).
10 Larry A. DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts: Standards and Principles (New York:
Transnational Publishers, 2001) at 213 [DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts] citing
Roscoe Pound, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 at 63.
11 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 213 (‘‘At the beginning of the
present century, Pound saw the law returning to the equitable mode that reverberated
during the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century. This was seen as a
reaction to the strictness and formalism of the nineteenth century. By the middle of this
century the pendulum had begun to swing from free contracting towards fairness in the
exchange”).
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be said about the future role of equitable principles and reasoning in Canadian
law? By nature, I am broadly referring to questions of constitutive authority (i.e.,
distinguishing between equitable principles found in statutes, regulations, and
common law jurisprudence), categorization or labelling (i.e., delineating the
treatment of equitable principles in consumer protection statutes, electronic
commerce statutes, and other statutes allowing for specialized equitable
interventions), and the content and related changes in equitable and doctrinal
tests in common law jurisprudence, among other questions. By frequency, I am
broadly referring to longitudinal trends on how certain equitable principles and
remedies have been considered and applied in Canadian contract law.
These questions are premised on the understanding that emerging
technologies suffer from notable limitations in the contracting process
(limitations in both technologies’ capacity to emulate human competencies and
other unfavourable impacts on contracting parties). Alexander Savelyev argues
that current computer technologies are ‘‘indifferent to fundamental legal
principles, such as lawfulness, fairness, and protection of the weaker party.”12
In a similar vein, Marc Lauritsen noted that although ‘‘[m]achines are getting
better at interacting with natural language in both written and spoken material
[they] are far from grasping the nuances of communications that depend on
common sense or metaphorical expression.”13 Perhaps more important than
technical limitations, Eliza Mik recently warned that ‘‘[t]he problem does not lie
in technology, or computers, becoming autonomous but in technology
increasingly encroaching upon human autonomy.”14 She explained:
. . . it is not persuasive technologies per se that warrant legal attention.
It is the combination of technology and personal information that
12 Alexander Savelyev, ‘‘Contract law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts as the Beginning of the End of
Classic Contract Law” (2017) 26:2 Inf. & Comm. Tech. L. 116 at 128 (‘‘Instead the
principles of certainty and effectiveness prevail”).
13 Marc Lauritsen, ‘‘Marketing Real Lawyers in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” (2017)
34:2 Law Prac. Mgmt. 68 at 69 (‘‘They lack our intuitive sense of when people mean
something different from what they say. They don’t ‘get’ most strategic dimensions of
human conversation, let alone display emotional intelligence. Other human skills and
accomplishments are unlikely soon to bematched by computers— things like creativity,
empathy, imagination, humor, ideation, and discernment”) [Lauritsen, ‘‘Marketing
Real Lawyers”]. See also Edwina L. Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence andLaw: Stepping
Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning” (1990) 99 Yale L.J. 1957 at 1959 (‘‘Any
discussion ofAImust note that tasks involving ‘common sense’ reasoning or perception,
such as language understanding, are by far the most difficult for AI. More technical
tasks, like solving calculus problems or playing chess, are usually much easier. That is
because the latter can be framed in well-defined terms and come from totally black-and-
white domains, while the former cannot and do not”) [Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence
and Law”].
14 Eliza Mik, ‘‘Persuasive Technologies: From Loss of Privacy to Loss of Autonomy” in
Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather &Ross Grantham, eds., Private Law in the 21st Century
(Oxford: Hart, 2017) at 364 [Barker, Fairweather, & Grantham, eds., Private Law in the
21st Century].
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creates unprecedented capabilities on the side of internet companies
and unprecedented weaknesses on the side of the internet users. This
combination enables new forms of commercial exploitation and
discrimination... [E]ntire websites can be customised to match the
cognitive preferences of specific individuals, and entire marketing
strategies can be designed to target specific persons based on the
idiosyncratic... desires and vulnerabilities. If we associate autonomy
with the ability to choose one action over another, then we much also
draw a link between the loss of privacy, inherent in the collection and
utilisation of the personal information, and the gradual reduction or
manipulation of options on the side of those whose information is
collected and utilised.15
Equity, on the other hand, is described by Leonard Rotman as a ‘‘process by
which positive law is brought closer to the human condition... a way of elevating
the law and facilitating the achievement of justice in the broadest sense of the
term while providing sound parameters for the exercise of judicial discretion.”16
It is further described by the Supreme Court as ‘‘malleable”17 and having the
capacity to ‘‘accommodate the changing needs and mores of society.”18 Henry E.
Smith, for example, wrote extensively about equity’s ‘functional’ role in contract
law as a ‘‘safety valve aimed at countering opportunism”19 and DiMatteo has
also highlighted the appropriateness of equitable principles for offsetting the
‘‘problem of asymmetrical information”20 in modern contracts, noting: ‘‘[t]he
law needs to respond to changing conditions. The time lag between societal and
legal change can be addressed by the flexibility of equity and through equitable
principles.”21 In other words, if ‘‘[t]he strictness of legal rules, applied in every
case, must be offset by some flexibility to ensure greater fairness,”22 equitable
principles appear to be a natural fit for the onset of new technologies. I was also
15 Ibid. at 363-64. See also DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 216.
16 ‘‘Fusion of Law and Equity,” supra note 4 at 501.
17 Alexander J. Black, ‘‘Under Influence and Unconscionability in Contracts and the
Equitable Remedy of Rescission in Canada” (2012) 40 Adv. Q. 80 at 81; Becker v.
Pettkus, 1980 CarswellOnt 299, 1980 CarswellOnt 644, (sub nom. Pettkus v. Becker)
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.) at para. 37 (‘‘The great advantage of ancient principles of
equity is their flexibility: the judiciary is thus able to shape thesemalleable principles so as
to accommodate the changing needs and mores of society, in order to achieve justice”)
[Pettkus].
18 Ibid. See also Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton Co., 1991 CarswellBC 269, 1991
CarswellBC 925, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.) at para. 52 (‘‘the maxims of equity can be
flexibly adapted to serve the ends of justice as preceived in our days. They are not rules
that must be rigorously applied but malleable principles intended to serve the ends of
fairness and justice”).
19 HenryE. Smith, ‘‘TheEconomics of Property Law” inTheOxfordHandbook of Lawand
Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 24 [Smith, ‘‘The Economics of
Property Law”].
20 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 216.
21 Ibid. at 260.
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particularly tempted to study the link between equity and technology after
coming across several recent and seemingly related Supreme Court decisions on
standard form contracts,23 hyperlinks and abusive forum selection clauses,24
rectification,25 unconscionability,26 estoppel27 and honesty in contractual
performance,28 all of which attributed considerable weight to the impact of
information asymmetry, standardization, convenience of contracting, and/or
equitable reasoning.
While some have studied the general evolution of equity in Canadian
contract law,29 none to the present day have systematically studied equity’s
22 DiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’s Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 2.
23 SeeLedcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, 2016
CarswellAlta 1699, 2016 CarswellAlta 1700 (S.C.C.) at para. 4, Wagner J. (‘‘Where, like
here, the appeal involves the interpretation of a standard form contract, the interpreta-
tion at issue is of precedential value, and there is no meaningful factual matrix that is
specific to the particular parties to assist in the interpretation process, this interpretation
is better characterized as a question of law subject to a correctness standard of review”);
Sabean v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co., 2017 SCC 7, 2017 CarswellNS 38,
2017 CarswellNS 39 (S.C.C.).
24 SeeDouez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC33, 2017CarswellBC1663, 2017CarswellBC1664
(S.C.C.) at paras. 104, 112, Abella J. (‘‘when online consumer contracts of adhesion
contain terms that unduly impede the ability of consumers to vindicate their rights in
domestic courts, particularly their quasi-constitutional rights... public policy concerns
outweigh those favouring enforceability of a forum selection clause... The doctrine of
unconscionability, a close jurisprudential cousin to both public policy and gross
bargaining disparity, also applies to render the forum selection clause unenforceable”)
[Douez].
25 SeeCanada (Attorney General) v. Fairmont Hotels Inc., 2016 SCC 56, 2016 CarswellOnt
19252, 2016CarswellOnt 19253 (S.C.C.) at para. 32 (‘‘It therefore falls to a party seeking
rectification to show not only the putative error in the instrument, but also the way in
which the instrument should be rectified in order to correctly record what the parties
intended to do”) [Fairmont Hotels]; Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2016 SCC 55, 2016 CarswellQue 11182, 2016 CarswellQue 11183 (S.C.C.)
[Jean Coutu].
26 See Douez, supra note 24 at para 112, Abella J.
27 See Cowper-Smith v. Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, 2017 CarswellBC 3482, 2017 CarswellBC
3483 (S.C.C.) at para. 29,McLachlin C.J.C. (‘‘The Court of Appeal majority’s proposed
bright line rule—namely, that reliance on apromise by apartywith nopresent interest in
property can never be reasonable — is out of step with equity’s purpose, which is to
temper the harsh effects of strict legal rules”) [Cowper-Smith].
28 See Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, 2014 CarswellAlta 2046, 2014 CarswellAlta 2047
(S.C.C.) at para. 74, Cromwell J. (‘‘I am at this point concerned only with a new duty of
honest performance and, as I see it, this should not be thought of as an implied term, but
as a general doctrine of contract law that imposes as a contractual duty a minimum
standard of honest contractual performance. It operates irrespective of the intentions of
the parties, and is to this extent analogous to equitable doctrines which impose limits on
the freedom of contract, such as the doctrine of unconscionability”) [Bhasin].
29 See e.g. DiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’s Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 (writing on the
twentieth century’s ‘‘equitable reformation of contract law”); Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law
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relationship to technological development. DiMatteo, for example, explored the
link between the ideological rise of free-market capitalism in mid-eighteenth
century (citing Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, among other works, and
the invisible hand),30 but did not focus on technology’s role in the evolution of
equity.31 In this article, I argue that technological developments in the mid-to-
late twentieth century are responsible, in large part, both directly and indirectly,
for the substantial codification of equitable principles into Canadian statutes and
regulations — a trend loosely described by American scholar Roscoe Pound as
‘‘contractual dirigism”32 — or the process of moving from a ‘‘system dominated
by the common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by
legislatures, have become primary sources of law.”33 As asserted by DiMatteo,
‘‘[t]here is no doubt that there was a fundamental shift in Anglo-American
contract law from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. At the
jurisprudential level contract law moved from an unswerving allegiance to
freedom of contract to a greater focus upon correcting substantive and
procedural fairness of the exchange.”34 Equally, in the Canadian context,
Professor Patrick Atiyah noted a ‘‘huge growth of statutory interventions in
contract law, much of which is designed to ensure substantive fairness in
exchange.”35 In short, I argue that the huge growth of equitable statutory
interventions should be understood against the backdrop of information
asymmetry, standardization, and an unprecedented convenience of contracting,
all of which were brought on by early computer technologies in the late twentieth
and Equity,” supra note 4; Samuel L. Bray, ‘‘The System of Equitable Remedies” (2016)
63U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 530 (writing on the evolution and integration of equitable remedies
into the common law); Jeff Berryman, ‘‘Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable
Remedies: What Canada Can Do for You?” (2002) 33 V.U.W.L.R. 51 (writing
specifically on the evolution of injunctive remedies and specific performance).
30 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 43-58 citing William L. Clark,
Jr., Law of Contracts, 3d ed. (St Paul: West Publishing, 1914) at 140 (‘‘So long as a man
gets what he has bargained for, and it is of some value in the eye of the law, the courts will
not ask what its value may be to him, or whether its value is in any way proportionate to
his act or promise given in return”).
31 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 29-81.
32 Roscoe Pound, ‘‘Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law” (1951) 100:1 U. Penn. L.
Rev. 1 at 7.
33 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard
University Press, 1982) at 1.
34 DiMatteo,Equitable Law ofContracts, supra note 10 at 99. See alsoDiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’s
Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 338 (‘‘ModernAnglo-American contract law
can be divided into three eras: the end of thewrit system, alongwith the separation of law
and equity in the eighteenth century, the evolution of classical contract theory of the
nineteenth century, and the erosion or reformation of classical contract law in the
twentieth... modern contract law has seen a ‘revival of interest in... unjust exchange and
legal doctrines such as unconscionability”).
35 PatrickAtiyah, ‘‘Contract andFairExchange” (1985) 35U.T.L.J. 1 at 1, 3 [Atiyah, ‘‘Fair
Exchange”].
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century. As noted by James R. Beniger in The Control Revolution, the social
changes brought on by former innovations are crucial for understanding how
present and future changes will materialize: ‘‘[a]s in the earlier revolutions in
matter and energy technologies, the nineteenth century revolution in information
technology was predicated on, if not directly caused by, social changes associated
with earlier innovations.”36 Thus, understanding technology’s role in the
evolution of equity allows us to apply historical lessons to Canada’s current
socio-political context which may not necessarily be undergoing a revolution, but
is influenced by technologies tugging at contract law in new ways.
Second, recognizing that recent technologies — most notably artificial
intelligence (‘‘AI”), blockchain, and smart contracts — present a unique set of
challenges for contract law not exhibited by earlier technologies — or what Eliza
Mik recently characterized, for example, as a near complete encroachment on
human autonomy37 — I argue that new technologies will push equitable
principles and reasoning further into provincial statutes and regulations. Indeed,
as stated by Kit Barker, ‘‘we must clearly prepare ourselves for yet more
statutory intervention.”38 While much has been written about these technologies
in doctrinal sources,39 references to AI, blockchain, or smart contracts in
Canadian jurisprudence are uncommon, and often for purposes unrelated to
legal issues. Still, there are major differences between AI, blockchain, and smart
contracts versus earlier technologies (e.g. contracting through hyperlinks or
online Terms and Conditions) that need to be considered.40 Most notably, while
both create information asymmetry and raise privacy concerns, recent
technologies are programmed to make autonomous contractual decisions
based on a person’s idiosyncrasies. In this article, I, likewise, set out to explore
how recent technologies limiting contractual autonomy in unprecedented ways
could influence the treatment of equitable reasoning in Canadian contract law.
The importance of this exercise, for Douglas Laycock and others, i.e., delineating
the role of equity in modern contract law, involves striking ‘‘the right balance
36 James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the
Information Society (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 10 [Beniger,
The Control Revolution].
37 Mik, supra note 14 at 364.
38 Kit Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System: Agendas for the Twenty-First Century”
[Barker, ‘‘PrivateLawas aComplexSystem”] inBarker, Fairweather,&Grantham, eds.,
Private Law in the 21st Century, supra note 14 at 17.
39 See e.g.DinaMoussa&GarrettWindle, ‘‘FromDeepBlue toDeepLearning:AQuarter
Century of Progress for ArtificialMinds” (2016) 1GeorgetownL. Tech. Rev. 72; Riikka
Koulu, ‘‘Blockchains andOnlineDisputeResolution: SmartContracts as anAlternative
toEnforcement” (2016) 13:1 Scripted 40; Stacy-AnnElvy, ‘‘Contracting in theAgeof the
Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond” (2016) 44 Hofstra L. Rev. 839;
George S. Geis, ‘‘Automating Contract Law” (2008) 83 N.Y.U.L. Rev 450; Mark
Gediman, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence: Not Just Sci-Fi Anymore” (2016) 21 A.A.L.L. Spec.
34.
40 See Mik, supra note 14 at 363-64.
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between discretion and formalism.”41 Rotman reiterates a similar opinion and
describes this exercise as follows: ‘‘[m]aintaining a jurisprudential system that
appropriately balances the certainty of law and the malleability of equity requires
a delicate equilibrium that neither tilts too far toward taxonomy or
arbitrariness.”42
This article proceeds in three subsequent parts. First, in Part 2, I provide a
short literature review on (a) the history and theory of equitable reasoning in
Canada, studying the modern sources of equitable principles in Canadian
contract law, and commenting on and distinguishing equitable principles found
in statutes, regulations, and those found in common law, and (b) recent
technological developments impacting Canadian contract law. In part 3, I then
propose a series of recommendations for making better use of equitable
principles to counterbalance some of the adverse effects of new technologies for
contracting parties, commenting on the future role of legal and professional
education in Canada. I end by summarizing the article’s main points in Part 4.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
a) Historical Developments On Equity In Common Law
As observed by Pound, and reiterated more recently by DiMatteo, the
historical treatment of equity has been ‘‘cyclical in nature... [owing to] an
ongoing oscillation between the strictness of law and equity’s response to the
injustices produced by the strict application of that law.”43 In this section, I
explore how the cyclical treatment of equity speaks to the close connection
between law and ideological changes — a product of socio-economic-political
conditions at any moment in time.
While some have chronicled the evolution of equity since the early twelfth
century,44 for the purposes of this article, I focus on 3 eras of equity since the
mid-eighteenth century. These can be loosely depicted as (1) a separation of law
and equity on moral and religious grounds; (2) the rise of freedom of contract
ideology and rejection of equity owing to the industrial revolution; and (3) what
DiMatteo and others have more recently referred to as the ‘‘equitable
modification”45 of modern contract law or the surge of equitable principles
and reasoning in jurisprudence and statute.
41 ‘‘The Triumph of Equity” (1993) 56:3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 53 at 75. See also
Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims,” supra note 8 at 181.
42 ‘‘Fusion of Law and Equity,” supra note 4 at 529.
43 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 213 citing Pound, Philosophy of
Law, supra note 2 at 63.
44 See e.g. DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 3-28.
45 DiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’sModification ofContract,” supra note 2 at 298 (‘‘The expanded use
of equitable principles and the infusion of good faith into contract law in the twentieth
century has led to an equitablemodification of contract law”);DiMatteo, Equitable Law
ofContracts, supra note 10 at 107-130. See also P.S. Atiyah,TheRise and Fall of Freedom
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First, in the early eighteenth century, and for much of England’s prior
history, ‘‘[a]grarian economies were mostly dominated by individually agreed
contracts where the parties to the contract negotiated ‘at arms length’ all its
terms.”46 During this period, the role of equitable reasoning was pronounced in
England’s legal system as the early Courts of Chancery grounded their decisions
in the medieval concepts of reason and conscience, where ‘‘conscience” held that
judges ‘‘must not only follow precedent, but also be guided by [their] own sense
of justice.”47 In other words, as noted by DiMatteo, contract law at this time
‘‘had a decidedly moral and equitable demeanor.”48 In order to have an
enforceable contract during this period, not only did it have to satisfy the formal
rules of contract law, but ‘‘it had to be judged fair.”49 Similarly, in the American
context, a contract had to be ‘‘both legal and equitable before a party could call
on a jury to execute the agreement.”50 In short, what was characteristic about the
early to mid-eighteenth century — in direct contrast to the early parts of the
nineteenth century — was that the foundation of contract law was ‘‘not promise
or will or consent, but community-based notions of fairness, including notions of
just price.”51
However, towards the end of the eighteenth century — spurred by the arrival
of England’s industrial revolution and its associated socio-economic-political
changes — contract law underwent an ideological transformation towards
freedom of contract and strict rule application.52 ‘‘The older ideas of morality of
promise and just price gave way to the ideology of freedom of contract.”53 In the
seminal English case Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,54 for example, the Court of
of Contract (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 681-715 (chronicling the
‘‘decline of freedom of contract in England during the period 1870 to 1970”) [Atiyah,
Freedom of Contract].
46 Savelyev, supra note 12 at 120.
47 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xi.
48 Ibid. See alsoW.S.Holdsworth, ‘‘EarlyHistoryofEquity” (1914) 13Mich.L.Rev. 293 at
295 (‘‘The equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor, then, was based on an application of
the current ideas of the canonists of the fifteenth century... The lawofGodor of nature or
of reasonmust be obeyed; and these laws require, and through, the agency of conscience,
enable abstract justice to be done in each individual case, even at the cost of dispensing...
the law”).
49 Ibid. at 31.
50 Gilchreest v. Pollock (1795), 2 Yeates 18, 1795 Pa. LEXIS 54 (P.A. S.C.) at 19 [Yeates]
citing in Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977) at 165 [Horwitz, Transformation of Law]. However, as noted by
DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 31, ‘‘[t]his was clearly an Anglo-
American phenomenon”).
51 Peter Linzer, A Contracts Anthology, 2nd ed. (Anderson Publishing Co., 1995) at 126.
52 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xii.
53 Ibid.
54 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, [1750] 1 Atk 301, 26 E.R. 191 (Eng. Ch. Div.).
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Chancery had enforced an unfair bargain that was freely entered by the parties,
marking what DiMatteo depicted as the ‘‘rise of the use of intent or will as the
litmus of enforceability.”55 Professor Atiyah, in The Rise and Fall of Freedom of
Contract, delineates this period as roughly 1770-1870,56 observing: ‘‘[t]he
equitable doctrines allowing the courts to relieve various unfortunate events
from the effects of hard bargains gradually whittled down.”57 This freedom of
contract ideology can be understood as ‘‘a dual belief that private parties should
be free to contract on any terms that they desire and be free from terms and
obligations imposed by law.”58 Implied warranties, for example, were rejected at
this time in favour of caveat emptor. Professor Atiyah also observed that judges
in the late 1700s were most concerned about the long-term effects of their
decisions, or ‘‘the impact on future behaviour through a pure application of
principles in particular cases.”59 Freedom of contract had gained traction after
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776)60 and after changes brought on by
the industrial revolution, such as the ‘‘quantitative explosion”61 of contracts and
the associated reformulation of contract law ‘‘from a primarily public law to
private law.”62 Savelyev also noted that industrial society witnessed an
emergence of ‘‘more simplified form[s] of contracting using standardized terms,
which allow[ed] mass-market contracting with minimized human involvement in
the negotiation process and lower transaction costs.”63 James Beniger, for
example, in his work The Control Revolution,64 explained that a number of
‘‘dramatic new information-processing and communication technologies”65 had
influenced the ‘‘production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services.”66 These encompassed the telegraph, telephone, and ‘‘power-driven,
multiple-rotary printing and mass mailing by rail”67 because ‘‘[a]t the outset of
55 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 43.
56 Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 at 12ff.
57 Ibid. at 73.
58 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 43.
59 Ibid. at 55 citing Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 at 394-95.
60 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London:
Strahan & Cadell, 1776) [Smith,Wealth of Nations].
61 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 44.
62 Ibid.
63 Savelyev, supra note 12 at 117-18.
64 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 16-19.
65 Ibid. at 16.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. at 18. See also ibid. at 7 (‘‘the word revolution seems barely adequate to describe the
development,within the spanof a single lifetime, of virtually all the basic communication
technologies still in use a century later: photography and telegraphy (1830s), rotary
power printing (1840s), the typewriter (1860s), transatlantic cable (1866), telephone
(1876), motion pictures (1984), wireless telegraphy (1895), magnetic tape recording
(1899), radio (1906), and television (1923)”).
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the Industrial Revolution, most printing was still done on wooden handpresses...
[from] three centuries earlier.”68 Freedom of contract continued into the 1800s,
where ‘‘judges finally reject[ed] the belief that the justification of contractual
obligation is derived from the inherent justice or fairness in the exchange.”69
Finally, a third transformation took place roughly between 1870-1970, a time
period that was characterized by Atiyah and others as ‘‘the decline and fall of
freedom of contract.”70 Indeed, it was during this period that the English
Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 came into force, which formally abolished the
English Courts of Chancery, but thereby ‘‘infused equitable principles into the
common law of contracts.”71 As described by DiMatteo, ‘‘[t]he full enforcement
of contract as dictated by a cold application of freedom of contract [was]
modified in the twentieth century by the countervailing principle of fairness of
the exchange.”72 There was a noticeable return to equity in legislative
intervention (e.g. consumer protection acts) and ‘‘an expansion in the use of
equitable principles by the courts.”73 These changes were brought on by the
steady realization that ‘‘the field of contracting is not one of pure competition...
[and] that unrestricted freedom of contract is likely to cause inefficient and unjust
consequences.”74 The attitudes of courts during this period shifted from a strict
allegiance to freedom of contract to doing justice ‘‘in the circumstances of the
case.”75 Theorists like Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) emerged during this period
and characterized a ‘‘just” contract as ‘‘not simply any contract freely consented
to... [but] a contract by which things and services are exchanged at the true and
normal values, in short, at the just value.”76 Indeed, courts recognized that
earlier freedom of contract doctrines, such as the doctrine of consideration, were
not enough to ensure substantive fairness of contractual relationships — a
realization that was not inconsistent with Adam Smith’s earlier theories on free-
market capitalism (who recognized ‘‘[t]he government is responsible for
correcting the deleterious consequences of commercial society when such
consequences derive from the very nature of a complex, specialized free
market economic order.”)77 Such specialization and standardization ultimately
68 Ibid.
69 See Horwitz, Transformation of Law, supra note 50 at 160.
70 Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 at 571ff. See also Pound, Philosophy of law,
supra note 2 at 77.
71 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 29.
72 DiMatteo, ‘‘Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 270.
73 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xiii.
74 Ibid.
75 Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 at 395.
76 Emile Durkheim, Durkheim and the Law, ed., Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983) at 227.
77 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Fred R. Glahe, ed. (New York: Modern Library,
1978) at 102.
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created a ‘‘problem of asymmetrical information” that, as explained in Part 2 (c)
on Modern Sources of Equity, is on the rise today:
Preferences and tastes [have] become hyper-specialized. On the negative
side, the large wealth of information has created the potential for a
knowledge gap. The ability to access, synthesize, and utilize all the
available information has become a daunting task. Thus, to the
unsophisticated and undermanned person or entity the information gap
between it and its contracting partner may be profound. This
information gap impairs the voluntariness of choice and the eventual
optimality of the contractual allocation of benefits and burdens.78
b) Theoretical Perspectives On Equity, Contract Law, And Technology
Theorical discussions on equity in contract law often begin with Aristotle’s
understanding of epieikeia, which he understood as ‘‘law where law is defective
because of its generality.”79 As noted by Aristotle and elaborated more recently
by Henry E. Smith, law is inevitably general and cannot cover the full range of
the human experience. For Aristotle and Smith, opportunists in every legal
system are ‘‘trying to take unfair advantage of the law... looking for weak points
in the law to exploit.”80 Accordingly, from a functionalist perspective, protection
from broadly applicable standards of conduct is necessary as ‘‘the general law on
its own cannot serve the rule of law values of stability and certainty.”81 In other
words, for Smith, ‘‘equity in private law is a coherent package of features
motivated largely by one overriding goal: preventing opportunism.”82 He calls
this the ‘‘equitable function”83 and argues that it transcends the historic divided
between law and equity:84
I have defined opportunism as ‘behavior that is undesirable but that
cannot be cost-effectively captured — defined, detected, and deterred
— by explicit ex ante rulemaking... It often consists of behavior that is
technically legal but is done with a view to securing unintended benefits
from the system, and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs of
78 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 216-17.
79 Henry E. Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law” [Smith, ‘‘Fusing the
Equitable Function”] in Barker, Fairweather & Grantham, eds., Private Law in the 21st
Century, supra note 14 at 177 citing Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, J. Ackrill & J.
Urmson, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
80 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 177. See also ibid. citing
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 164.
81 Ibid.
82 Smith, ‘‘The Economics of Property Law,” supra note 19 at 3. See also ibid. at 9-10
(‘‘[opportunism] consists of behaviour that is technically legal but is done with a view to
secure unintended benefits from the system”).
83 Henry E. Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 177.
84 Ibid.
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they impose on others.’ The response needs to be ex post, and partially
discretionary.85
However, equity’s functional role to prevent opportunism must be balanced
with concerns for ensuring the certainty and predictability of the law, and
recognizing party autonomy in contract. Indeed, H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of
Law wrote that ‘‘all legal systems, in different ways, compromise between two
social needs: the need for certain rules... and the need to leave open ... issues that
can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case.”86 Nevertheless, as noted by Carlo Vittoria Giabardo, ‘‘in order to guide
future actions private law rules (wherever they might be embedded) must convey
a relatively shared and sufficiently predictable meaning on which parties can
reasonably rely in planning their future activities.”87 Because equitable analyses
are ‘‘second-order”88 functions — needing ‘‘to be ex post and tailored to the
situation”89 — legal systems must find an ‘‘equilibrium that neither tilts too far
toward taxonomy or arbitrariness.”90 In other words, as asserted by Douglas
Laycock and others, delineating the role of equity in modern contract law
involves striking ‘‘the right balance between discretion and formalism.”91
Next, in light of the three eras of the common’s treatment of equity, what can
be said about the link between technological innovation and the role of equity?
Professor James Beniger in The Control Revolution offers a useful perspective. He
argued that technological innovations create what he referred to as crises of
control.92 As technological innovations enhance society’s ability to process
materials or information, the associated effects outpace society’s ability to
control them:
85 Ibid. at 181 citing Henry E. Smith, ‘‘Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable” in A. Gold & P.
Miller, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014) at 10-11.
86 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 132.
87 Carlo Vittoria Giabardo, ‘‘Private Law in the Age of the ‘Vanishing Trial’” in Barker,
Fairweather & Grantham, eds, Private Law in the 21st Century, supra note 14 at 554.
88 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 175 (‘‘I argue that equity is a
limited second-order intervention to solve a class of problems characterized by both
complexity and uncertainty”). See also ibid. at 182 (‘‘The second-order equitable element
in the legal system can be treated as a safety-value”).
89 Ibid. at 179 (‘‘because opportunism calls for that kind of response”). See also DiMatteo,
Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 286 (‘‘An equitable conception of
contractual justice recognizes the increasingly intersubjective, relational nature of
modern contract law. It embraces contract law, not as amere system of rules, but of rules
tempered by standards and principles — a system not tied to static doctrine”).
90 Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law and Equity,” supra 4 at 529
91 ‘‘The Triumph of Equity” (1993) 56:3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 53 at 75. See also
Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims,” supra note 8 at 181.
92 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 219-21.
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‘‘[t]hroughout all previous history material goods had moved down
roadways and canals with the speed of draft animals; for centuries they
had moved across the seas at the whim of the winds. Suddenly, in a
matter of decades, goods began to move faster than even the winds
themselves, reliably and in mounting volume, through factories, across
continents, and around the world. For the first time in history, by the
mid-nineteenth century the social processing of material flows threa-
tened to exceed in both volume and speed the system’s capacity to
contain them. Thus was born the crisis of control.93
Indeed, since the early nineteenth century, Beniger identified a number of
control crises that were brought by important technological innovations.
Whether it was harnessing coal energy during the early industrial revolution,94
electrical energy in the late nineteenth century,95 or developing new information-
processing tools and computer chips in the latter part of the twentieth century,96
Beniger argued that all of these innovations initially outpaced society’s ability to
control them. Where control depended on ‘‘personal relationships and face-to-
face interactions”97 before the industrial revolution, it was eventually replaced by
‘‘the new infrastructures of transportation and telecommunications, and system-
wide communication via the new mass media.”98 However, each of these crises
was associated with a handful of societal problems unseen in previous eras.99 For
example, as noted by Beniger, mass production and distribution of wheat and
corn by rail in 1850 challenged farmers and shipping companies to keep track of
their shipments, avoid unnecessary spoilage, to keep their rail workers safe, and
ultimately to distribute these commodities to end-consumers.100
Most notably, as it relates to the purpose of this article, Beniger argued that
control crises always gave rise to centralization and bureaucratization.101 He
argued that human beings have an inherent need to control our surroundings,
both individually and collectively: ‘‘history alone cannot explain why it is
information that increasingly plays the crucial role in economy and society. The
answer must be sought in the nature of all living system — ultimately in the
relationship between information and control. Life itself implies control, after all,
in individual cells and organisms no less than in national economies or any other
purposive system.”102 He explained that while the rise of new technologies during
93 Ibid. at 219 [emphasis added].
94 Ibid. at 169-184.
95 Ibid. at 291-209.
96 Ibid. at 292.
97 Ibid. at 7.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. at 219-20.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. at 7-10.
102 Ibid. at vi.
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the industrial revolution (and more recently the information revolution) created
an initial crisis of control, a subsequent ‘‘control revolution... represented the
beginning of a restoration — although with increasing centralization — of the
economic and political control that was lost at more local levels of society during
the Industrial Revolution.”103 During this time, for example, theorists like Max
Weber wrote extensively about the rise of bureaucracy in society: ‘‘it is primarily
the capitalist market economy which means that the official business of the
administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with
as much speed as possible.”104 As noted above, the period following the
industrial revolution marked a notable shift away from ‘‘[t]he full enforcement of
contract as dictated by a cold application of freedom of contract”105 and saw a
rise of centralized regulatory efforts to address societal problems witnessed
during the early nineteenth century. A similar response to mass-media
advertising and its associated consumerism [spurred by the development of
radio (1906) and television (1923)]106 transpired in the mid-1900s with the rise of
consumer protection laws embodying the ‘‘principle of fairness of the
exchange.”107 Indeed, as observed by Beniger, ‘‘[t]he aggrieved consumer is not
a recent phenomenon, surely, but there is something about the conditions of life
in this last half of the twentieth century which has elevated consumer law to a
new level of interest.”108 Beniger also identified a crisis of control brought by ‘‘a
spate of new information-processing, communication, and control technologies
like the computer, most notably the microprocessors that have proliferated since
the early 1970s.”109
Finally, Beniger’s perspective remains informative today. Although
computer technologies have been around since the early 1970s, as argued by
Mik in 2017, new technologies, unlike their predecessors, are ‘‘creat[ing]
unprecedented capabilities on the side of internet companies and
unprecedented weaknesses on the side of internet users.” These issues are
discussed in Part 2 (B) and are primarily concerned with ‘‘technology
increasingly encroaching on human autonomy.”110 This development is a
notable shift away from former technologies (e.g. hyperlinks and Terms and
Conditions online), which required (and still require) instantaneous consent from
users, and — as observed by Beniger — there exists a ‘‘recurrent failure of past
generations to appropriate the major societal transformations of their own.”111
103 Ibid. at 7.
104 Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, translated by H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946) at 215. See also ibid. at 7.
105 DiMatteo, ‘‘Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 270.
106 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 7.
107 DiMatteo, ‘‘Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 270.
108 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 584.
109 Ibid. at 6.
110 Mik, supra note 14 at 364.
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While this technology is still in its infancy, if it were to become widely adopted
for the purposes of contracting, it could — through Beniger’s lens — result in
some form of control crisis, whereby existing contractual regimes would be less
than ideally suited for reconciling the aforementioned concerns for substantive
and procedural fairness. If this were the case, as explained by Beniger, we would
likely witness a response towards centralization and bureaucratization — or, as I
argue in Part 3 of this article — a greater reliance on equitable principles found in
statutes and regulations in order to offset ‘‘new forms of commercial exploitation
and discrimination”112 brought on by new technologies. Professor DiMatteo
likewise predicts that ‘‘[t]he increased complexity of modern goods, the
movement of goods, the movement from a goods-based to a service oriented
economy, the expansion of long-term, relational contracts, and the rapid
advancement of technology will continue to apply pressure on courts and
legislatures to intercede under the banner of fairness or justice in exchange.113 He
argues that ‘‘the corrective use of equitable principles provides the best means to
deal with the heightened uncertainties of an increasingly relational, longitudinal,
and cross-cultural contracting environment.”114 In the section that follows, I
explore how modern Canadian contract law has tried to achieve this equilibrium.
c) Modern Sources Of Equity In Canada
If understood in the ‘‘functional sense,”115 or alternatively as a distinct form
of reasoning,116 equity can be observed in several sources of law, including
statutes, regulations, and common law jurisprudence. For example, in the section
on ‘‘Historical Developments of Equity,” I cited several American scholars,
including Professor Patrick Atiyah writing on Canada, who noticed a dramatic
surge of equitable principles in statutes, regulations, and case law during the
twentieth century.117 Hanoch Dagan argued that the statutory intervention in
modern contract law provides: ‘‘an important example for the potential
significance of a supporting public law infrastructure.”118 However, much of
the scholarly work on equitable principles in contract law, especially in relation
to Canada, predates the recent emergence of technologies discussed in section 2
111 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 2.
112 Mik, supra note 14 at 363.
113 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xii.
114 Ibid. at 290.
115 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 174.
116 Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims,” supra note 8 at 181.
117 Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 at 395. See also Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a
Complex System,” supra note 38 at 3.
118 HanochDagan, ‘‘TheChallenges of PrivateLaw:AResearchAgenda for anAutonomy-
Based Private Law” in Barker, Fairweather & Grantham, eds., Private Law in the 21st
Century, supra note 14 at 83.
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(B).119 Thus, in the following section, I explore how Canadian courts and
legislators have treated equity in the last few decades.
1) Equity In Statutes
Since the 1960s, provinces across Canada have enacted legislation to
‘‘remedy unfair trade practices in the marketplace.”120 These have often taken
the form of Consumer Protection Acts,121 or some form of Business Practice
Act,122 recognizing, as noted by Terence Ison, many consumer issues ‘‘derive
from the failure of the legal system to adjust to the realities of mass
production.”123 Today, equitable principles are found in handful of provincial
statutes (provincial because section 92(13) of the Constitution Act gives provinces
the exclusive legislative power over property and civil rights in the province).124
For example, in Ontario, the main statutes containing equitable principles
connected to contract law are the Consumer Protection Act,125 the Frustrated
Contracts Act,126 the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act,127 the Insurance
Act,128 and the Sale of Goods Act.129 More recently, equitable principles can also
be found in each province’s Electronic Commerce Act, or some other version
thereof. In Ontario, for example, section 21 of the act stipulates:
[a]n electronic transaction between an individual and another person’s electronic
agent is not enforceable by the other person if,
(a) the individual makes a material error in electronic information or an
electronic document used in the transaction;
(b) the electronic agent does not give the individual an opportunity to prevent
or correct the error;
(c) on becoming aware of the error, the individual promptly notifies the other
person; and
119 See e.g. Atiyah, Freedom of Contract, supra note 45 (who ends his analysis in the 1970s).
120 Joseph Samuels&Neil Vidmar, ‘‘ConsumerComplaints andUnfair Trade Practices: An
Empirical study of Ontario’s Business Practices Act” (1987) 24 U.W.O. L. Rev. 83 at 83.
See also Edward P. Belobaba, ‘‘Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Legislation and
Substance in Consumer Protection” (1977) 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327 at 328.
121 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1966, c. 23.
122 Business Practice Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55.
123 M. James O’Grady, ‘‘Consumer Remedies” (1982) 60:4 Can. Bar Rev. 549 at 550 citing
Terence G. Ison, Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection (London: Croom Helm,
1979) at 14-15.
124 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s.
92(13).
125 Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, ss. 15-18 [CPA 2002].
126 Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.34 [FCA].
127 Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. U.2 [UTRA].
128 Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, ss. 129 (e.g. relief from forfeiture) [Insurance Act].
129 Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1, ss. 50 (e.g. specific performance).
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(d) in a case where consideration is received as a result of the error, the
individual,
(i) returns or destroys the consideration in accordance with the other
person’s instructions or, if there are not instructions, deals with the
consideration in a reasonable manner, and
(ii) does not benefit materially by receiving the consideration.130
In each of these statutes, some allowance is made for consumers, or
contractees more generally, to rescind their agreements on equitable grounds;
whether on the basis of unconscionability, frustration, relief from forfeiture,
mistake, or estoppel,131 among others. Nevertheless, while these statutes have
been around since the mid-twentieth century, there have been notable
developments (regarding their treatment of equity) in the twenty-first century.
Compare, for example, Ontario’s former Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990
c. C 31, with its more recent Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30,
Schedule A. Unlike the former statute, the latter makes explicit reference to
undue pressure,132 unconscionability,133 and more generally, unfair practices,134
recognizing an explicit right or remedy to rescind135 consumer agreements for
any of the above infractions. What is interesting is how the emergence of
equitable language in Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, 2002 had an influence
on the nature and frequency that this language was considered by the courts. For
example, using WestlawNext (Canada), I searched (‘‘unconscionable” or
‘‘unconscionability”) and (‘‘consumer protection act”), narrowing my search to
‘‘cases and decisions” and ‘‘Ontario.” Sorting the 33 total hits chronologically, I
noticed that there were only five decisions predating 2002, and of those five
decisions, the expression ‘‘unconscionability” is either invoked in a manner that
is unrelated to the legal issue or it is invoked as a doctrinal test from common law
jurisprudence.136 However, looking at more recent decisions, it was clear that the
130 Electronic Commerce Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 17 at s. 21 [emphasis added] [ECA].
131 See e.g. Insurance Act, supra note 128, ss. 131(1)(b) (‘‘The obligation of an insured to
comply with a requirement under a contract is excused to the extent that... (b) the
insurer’s conduct reasonably causes the insured to believe that the insurer’s compliance
with the requirement is excused in whole or in part, and the insured acts on that belief to
the insured’s detriment”).
132 CPA 2002, supra note 125, s. 15(2)(h).
133 Ibid. at s. 15.
134 Ibid. at ss. 14-19.
135 Ibid. at s. 18.
136 See e.g. Dominion Home Improvements Ltd. v. Knuude, 1986 CarswellOnt 1028, [1986]
O.J. No. 1888 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) at para. 13 citing Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., 1965
CarswellBC140, 55D.L.R. (2d) 710, 54W.W.R. 257 (B.C.C.A.) at 713 [D.L.R.], para. 4,
Davey J.A. (‘‘a plea that a bargain is unconscionable invokes relief against an unfair
advantage gained by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a
weaker.On such a claim thematerial ingredients are proof of inequality in the position of
the parties arising out of the ignorance, need or distress of the weaker, which left him in
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expression was often invoked with a pinpointed reference to section 15 of the
Act, sometimes with,137 but also sometimes without,138 any mention of the
common law rules or tests for assessing unconscionability in contract law.
Despite the codification of certain equitable principles, their application
today is relatively limited and mostly restricted to particular types of contracts.
The Consumer Protection Act, 2002 applies only to ‘‘consumer transactions”139
while the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act applies only ‘‘in respect to
money lent.”140 The Insurance Act and Sale of Goods Act likewise have
specialized applications. It appears that — at least in Ontario — the Frustration
Contracts Act is the only statute imposing equitable principles broadly on ‘‘any
contract that is governed by the law of Ontario.”141 As discussed in subsequent
sections, this leaves some room for the further codification of certain equitable
principles that may become more relevant with emerging of technologies and that
are not currently contained in statutes on contractual matters, like forfeiture,
rectification, Act of God, or a general duty of honesty in contractual
performance, among other principles. There may also be room to expand
certain principles’ applicability, like unconscionability, beyond their current
purviews of consumer protection and the loaning of money. Finally, it is also
important to note that contracts entered electronically (e.g. smart contracts) will
not be ‘‘invalid or unenforceable by reason only of being in electronic form”142
under each province’s Electronic Commerce Act. This means, of course, that the
statutory rules described above could potentially apply to new contracts.
2) Equity In Regulations
Canada has also witnessed an expansion in regulatory frameworks in the
twentieth century, imposing principled and ethical-based standards of conduct
on multiple sectors.143 A similar trend is taking place in the United Kingdom,
where T.T. Arvind and Joanna Gray observed:
the power of the stronger, and proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain obtained by
the stronger”).
137 See e.g. Paton Estate v. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corp., 2016 ONCA 458, 2016
CarswellOnt 9109 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 23-30.
138 See e.g. Centennial Windows Ltd. v. Le, 2015 CarswellOnt 16273 (Ont. S.C.J.).
139 CPA 2002, supra note 125, s. 2.
140 UTRA, supra note 127.
141 FCA, supra note 126 at s. 2 (though note the exceptions in s. 2(2)).
142 ECA, supra note 130, s. 4.
143 See e.g. Judith Hanebury, ‘‘Smart Regulation — Rhetoric or Reality” (2006) 44:1 Alta.
L. Rev. 33 at 45; Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., ‘‘Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory
Sandboxes to Smart Regulation” (2017) 23 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 31 at 31 (‘‘Prior
to the global financial crisis, financial innovation was viewed positively, resulting in a
laissez-faire, deregulatory approach... Since the crisis, the regulatory pendulum has
swung to the other extreme”).
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The transformation of the state in the course of [the early twentieth
century] has led to the creation of what is in effect a new jurisdiction —
the regulatory jurisdiction — which actively intervenes in the very same
relationships as private law, and which in intervening discharges the
very same ‘law jobs’ as private law once did: structuring relations,
resolving conflicting expectations, setting standards of conduct, and
prescribing remedies when those standards are transgressed.”144
‘‘Regulation,” in the context of this article, borrows Judith Hanebury’s
understanding of the term, who broadly defines it as the ‘‘delegated powers
transferred by a body empowered to pass laws, such as Parliament, to
subordinate bodies, including departments, commissions, boards, tribunals,
and others.”145 She further specifies that these ‘‘subordinate bodies may affect,
control, prescribe, or limit how citizens or corporate bodies act... [though] the
vast bodies of policies, guidelines, guidance notes, and other documents”146 —
what Carlos Giabardo and others referred to as the ‘‘public side of private
law.”147
Like equity itself, the role of regulation in Canada has been cyclical in
nature.148 Hanebury, for example, asserts that ‘‘Canada underwent strong
‘regulatory inflation’ during the 1970s and the early 1980s... [and] peaked in
1985.”149 This regulatory surge, however, was followed by a gradual trend
towards ‘‘deregulation and light-handed regulation, and the number of
regulations enacted during 2000 was approximately one-third of the peak
number.”150 According to Hanebury, Canada more recently entered a ‘‘third
phase of regulation”151 that she described as ‘‘smart regulation.”152 Smart
regulation strikes a balance between social and conservative approaches because
it is goal based or performance based, therefore ‘‘the regulation does not specify
144 T.T. Arvind & Joanna Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy: Private Law’s Future in the
Regulatory State” [Arvind & Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy”] in Barker, Fair-
weather & Grantham, eds., Private Law in the 21st Century, supra note 14 at 237-38.
145 Hanebury, ‘‘Smart Regulation — Rhetoric or Reality,” supra note 143 at 34.
146 Ibid.
147 Giabardo, supra note 87 at 559. See also Dagan, supra note 180 at 83-84.
148 See Hanebury, ‘‘Smart Regulation — Rhetoric or Reality,” supra note 143 at 34-41.
149 Ibid. at 37.
150 Ibid. citing OECD, Government Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation, OECD
Reviews of Regulatory Reform, Regulatory Reform in Canada (2002), online:
<www.oecd.org/canada/1960472.pdf>. See also Hanebury, ‘‘Smart Regulation —
Rhetoric orReality,” supranote 143 at 37 (‘‘However, this does not necessarilymean that
there was slower growth in regulation as the change in quasi-regulations (guidelines,
policies, guidance notes, and codes) was not measured. This apparent reduction in
regulation resulted from greater attention being paid by the government to the costs and
benefits of regulation and the alternatives to regulation”).
151 Ibid. at 39.
152 Ibid. citing Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation:
Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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the means of achieving compliance, but sets out goals that allow alternative ways
to achieve regulatory compliance.”153 It therefore uses broader aspirational goals
and standards of conduct to guide behaviour, an approach to regulation that is
more closely aligned with what Henry E. Smith referred to as ‘‘equity’s open-
ended nature”154 and ‘‘higher level”155 purpose or function, recognizing that
‘‘equity looks to the spirit rather than the letter of the law... [and] lends the
system of law a great deal of its openness.”156
The starting point for the functional theory of equity is to recognise
that there is a special class of problems calling for a more ‘meta’ kind of
solution than the law normally provides. Polycentric task, conflicting
rights, and opportunism all involve great complexity and un-certainty...
The question is what mechanism for control we need, and this can
either be improvements to the system — and more elaborate versions of
the rules that give rise to the complex variable problem — or moving to
a higher level.157
3) Equity In Common Law Jurisprudence
Finally, the mid-to-latter part of the twentieth century saw what Leonard
Rotman loosely referred to as ‘‘equitable bleed” or ‘‘where concepts of equity are
allowed to bleed into the common law and themselves become part of the
latter.”158 DiMatteo similarly observed that ‘‘[t]he expanded use of equitable
principles and the infusion of good faith during the twentieth century have lead
to an equitable modification of contract law.”159 At the outset, it is important to
acknowledge that Canada has ‘‘never developed an equity panel of judges.”160
Instead, as noted by Donovan Waters, ‘‘the Supreme Court of Canada has
remained a court of generalists — dealing from time to time with equitable
principles and doctrines... For practical purposes, therefore, the Supreme Court
of Canada at its beginning would conceive of law and equity as two bodies of
doctrine rather than two separate administrations.”161 However, as observed by
Rotman — and Smith in the American context — the ‘‘fusion of law and
equity”162 in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century affected the nature of
common law duties and reasoning in at least three ways: the proliferation of
153 Hanebury, ‘‘Smart Regulation — Rhetoric or Reality,” supra note 143 at 45.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid. at 180.
156 Ibid.
157 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 180 [emphasis added].
158 Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law and Equity,” supra note 4 at 534.
159 DiMatteo, ‘‘Equity’s Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 298.
160 Waters, ‘‘The Reception of Equity,” supra note 6 at 624.
161 Ibid.
162 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 173.
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standards and multi-factor balancing tests, the rise of contextualism, and the
broadening of civil remedies.163
First, the so-called ‘‘fusion of law and equity” spurred what Henry E. Smith
referred to as ‘‘multi-factor balancing tests” in the law of contract: ‘‘much of
substantive equity was replaced by multi-factor balancing tests and standards
because when it comes to the equitable function, that is the closest mono-level
substitute for a second-order safety valve.”164 Commenting on the move of
equity into common law tests, Arvind and Gray asserted that ‘‘courts are
increasingly faced with actions arising out of heavily regulated relationships, in
which their ability to deploy the traditional common law tests is necessarily
coloured by the need to engage with the aims, goals, and policies underlying the
relevant regulations, the majority of which are systemic and consequentialist.”165
These substantive, multifactor balancing tests typically incorporate some element
of discretionary proportionality assessment by the judge, giving ‘‘the appearance
of something more constrained than total discretion.”166 For example, the
Supreme Court in Douez v. Facebook, Inc. recently established a new common
law test for determining whether a forum selection clause is enforceable in a
consumer context, writing: ‘‘[w]hen considering whether it is reasonable and just
to enforce an otherwise binding forum selection in a consumer contract, courts
should take account of all the circumstances of the particular case, including
public policy considerations relating to the gross inequality of bargaining power
between the parties and the nature of the rights at state.”167 Albeit a common law
test — and while the court did not refer to equity — this is a clear example of a
recent multi-factor balancing test in the technology space created to fulfil equity’s
‘safety valve’ function.
Second, as asserted by Henry E. Smith, contextualism in law and
jurisprudence ‘‘is an artifact of the overdoing of fusion.”168 Indeed, if equity
serves a higher-level function than legal rules, and is open-ended in nature, the
fusion of legal and equitable doctrines, coupled with the onset of multi-factor
balancing tests — put contextualism at the forefront of contract theory. Since the
late 1990s, there was a notable shift away from the historic common law
approach to contractual interpretation in Canada, where — as noted by the
Supreme Court in Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp. — ‘‘the
interpretation of written documents had to be considered questions of law
because only the judge could be assured to be literate and therefore capable of
reading the contract.”169 Instead, ‘‘the interpretation of contracts has evolved
towards a practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical rules of
163 Ibid. at 188.
164 Ibid.
165 Arvind & Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy,” supra note 144 at 237.
166 Ibid.
167 Douez, supra note 24 at para 38, Karakatsanis, Wagner & Gascon JJ.
168 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 193.
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construction”170 [where] ‘‘a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole,
giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with
the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of
the contract.”171 Douez v. Facebook, Inc. is a good example of the contextual
approach and highlights why a strict adhesion to the words of a contract and
agreement between the parties would have serious limitations in practice,
especially today in regards to contracts using or accessing popular technologies
like online social media:
unlike standard retail transaction, there are few comparable alterna-
tives to Facebook... British Columbians who wish to participate in the
many online communities that interact through Facebook must accept
that company’s terms or choose not to participate... [A]ccess to
Facebook and social media platforms... have become increasingly
important for the exercise of free speech, freedom of association and for
full participation in democracy. Having the choice to remain ‘offline’
may not be a real choice in the Internet era.172
Finally, the so-called fusion of law and equity resulted in a broadening of
civil remedies.173 Whereas rescission, specific performance, and injunction were
historically equitable remedies that gave judges a wide degree of discretion in a
limited number of circumstances, modern treatments of these remedies allow for
a broader application. As noted by Alexander J Black, the exercise of equitable
discretion in granting remedies was historically limited by principles taking the
form of maxims, like equity follows the law, delay defeats equity, he who comes
to equity must come with clean hands, and the law prevails where equities are
equal.174 In other words, a plaintiff could not receive an equitable remedy
‘‘without first showing that there is no adequate remedy at law.”175 As noted by
Professor Samuel Bray, however, in modern law ‘‘[t]hat rule has been much
criticized for not actually affecting courts’ decisions about whether to give an
equitable remedy.”176 Alexander Black reiterates this point and argues that the
169 Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp., 2014 SCC 53, 2014 CarswellBC 2267, 2014
CarswellBC 2268 (S.C.C.) at para. 43, Rothstein J. [Sattva].
170 Ibid. at para 47 citing Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v. Guardian Insurance Co. of
Canada, 2006 SCC 21, 2006 CarswellOnt 3265, 2006 CarswellOnt 3266 (S.C.C.) at para
27, LeBel J.; Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation
Highways), 2010 SCC 4, 2010 CarswellBC 296, 2010 CarswellBC 297 (S.C.C.) at paras.
64-65.
171 Sattva, supra note 169 at para 47, Rothstein J.
172 Douez, supra note 24 at para 56, Karakatsanis, Wagner & Gascon JJ.
173 See Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 193.
174 Alexander J. Black, ‘‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability in Contracts and the
Equitable Remedy of Rescission in Canada” (2012) 40 Adv. Q. 80 at 81 [Black, ‘‘Undue
Influence”] citing Pro Swing, supra note 9 at para 2.
175 Samuel L. Bray, ‘‘The SystemofEquitableRemedies” (2016) 63U.C.L.A.R.Rev. 530 at
535.
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practical utility of maxims is almost inexistent today as courts determine
applicable law from an array of common law rules, statutes, and doctrines.177
Writing on the evolution of private law in the twenty-first century, Kit
Barker explains that the broadening of equitable remedies is a product of
‘‘increasingly sophisticated, invasive techno-logies”178 that give rise to new
abstract interests and creating new ‘‘demands for abstract rights.”179 For
example, she points to the continued expansion in common law jurisdictions of
specific performance remedies and cost of cure damages in contract law.180 Given
the abstract nature of interests created by new technologies (as captured by the
Civil Liberties Association in Douez as interveners),181 there are broader
considerations that must be taken into account when resolving modern contract
disputes that call for more discretion. At the heart of this discussion is the
understanding that equitable remedies are assaults on freedom of contract and
autonomy. In other words, by asking a court to rescind a contract or to grant
specific performance or an injunction, the party is conceding that a contract was
formed. There is therefore a delicate balance that must be made between overly
permissive and overly restrictive remedies, a challenge that is likely to be
exacerbated by the onset of new technologies: ‘‘[t]he law must find a way of
expressing respect for persons as human agents exercising real dignity and choice,
without allowing itself to affirm the view that life is ‘all about me’ and never
about anyone else.”182
3. TECHNOLOGY AND CONTRACT LAW
On one hand, the influence of technology on the practice of law is nothing
new: internet, email, and legal research databases like Westlaw or LexisNexis
‘‘have been around for decades.”183 On the other, some believe ‘‘we may be on
176 Ibid. (although arguing that there remains a clear distinction between equitable and non-
equitable remedies).
177 Black, ‘‘Undue Influence,” supra note 174 at 81.
178 Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System,” supra note 38 at 7-8 (‘‘The gradual
introduction of such rights in most jurisdictions in recent years is a reaction to... new
technologies”).
179 Ibid. (‘‘Such rights are much needed, but still underdeveloped. They remain problematic
not just because they protect abstract interests, but because the claims for their
protection are themselves, in part, premised on the value of other, abstract human
interests such as personal autonomy and human dignity . . . At the same time as private
law is being asked to recognise and accommodate new forms of inte-rest, it is also being
challenged to ‘vindicate’ more effectively the rights that it already provides, though a
broader and more powerful range of remedies.”).
180 Ibid. at 8 citing S. Smith, ‘‘Substitutionary Damages” in C. Rickett, ed., Justifying
PrivateLawRemedies (Oxford:Hart, 2008), ch. 5 (suggesting that specific performance is
now available for the purely educative purpose of vindicating rights).
181 Douez, supra note 24 at para 56, Karakatsanis, Wagner & Gascon JJ.
182 Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System,” supra note 38 at 9.
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the precipice of a more fundamental shift,”184 and some ‘‘predicting a revolution
in the legal services market driven by the rise of new technologies.”185 At the
outset of this article, it is essential to delineate what is and what is not currently
possible using technology. While I am by no means an authority on the
technological capabilities available today, analyzing patterns in the principles
considered by courts requires a basic review of the ‘‘key aspects of legal reasoning
and... computational tools useful for legal practice, teaching, or research.”186
I begin this section by addressing the fundamental question of whether smart
contracts and other blockchain or artificial intelligence technologies can form
valid contracts under existing law. In short, the answer is yes — as long as the
agreement between the parties (however that agreement is expressed) meets all of
the necessary contracting requirements prescribed by law.187 Raymond Samuels
II, writing on Canada’s e-commerce laws, identifies six requirements: intention to
create legal relations, offer, acceptance, value consideration, capacity to contract,
and legality.188 In each province’s Electronic Commerce Act,189 or some form
thereof,190 a provision speaks to the validity of these requirements (minus
183 Dana Remus & Frank Levy, ‘‘Can Robots be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the
Practice of Law” (2017) 30 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 501 at 503 citing Debra Cassens Weiss,
‘‘Will Technology Create a Lawyer ‘Jobs-Pocalypse’? Doomsayers Overstate Impact,
Study Says” A.B.A. J. (5 January 2016).
184 Remus & Levy, supra note 182 at 503. See also Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘‘Disruptive
Technology—Disrupted Law? How the Digital Revolution Affects (Contract) Law” in
Alberto De Fransceschi, ed, European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market
(Cambridge, U.K.: Intersentia, 2016) at 21-48; Mik, supra note 14 at 363 (‘‘It is the
combination of technology and personal information that creates unprecedented
capabilities... and weaknesses”).
185 Tanina Rostain, ‘‘Robots Versus Lawyers: AUser-Centered Approach” (2017) 30 Geo.
J. Leg. Ethics 559 at 560.
186 Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Law,” supra note 13 at 1960.
187 See Reggie O’Shields, ‘‘Smart Contracts: Legal Arrangements for the Blockchain”
(2017) 21NorthCarolinaBanking Institute 177 at 180 at 189 (‘‘In order tobe valid, smart
contracts will have to be construed in such a way as tomeet long-established legal norms
for contracting”); Max Raskin, ‘‘The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts” (2017) 1
Georgetown L. Tech. Rev. 305 at 305 (‘‘The article concludes that smart contracts are
simply a form of preemptive self-help that should not be discouraged by the legislatures
or courts.While certain unconscionable examples of strong smart contracts may need to
be policed, judges and policymakers should foster a climate that treats smart contracts as
another form of more traditional agreements”).
188 Raymond Samuels II, ed., Contract Law Backgrounder to E-Commerce Affiliate
Programs (Kanata, ON: Agora Business Foundation, 2002) at 7-8.
189 ECA, supra note 130.
190 See e.g. Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10 (B.C.); Electronic Commerce and
Information Act, C.C.S.M. 2001, c. E55 (Manitoba); Electronic Information and
Documents Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. E-7.22 (Saskatchewan); Electronic Transactions
Act, S.A. 2001, c. E-5.5 (Alberta); Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. E-5.2
(Newfoundland & Labrador); Electronic Transactions Act, R.S.N.B. 2001, c. 145 (New
Brunswick); Electronic Transactions Act, S.N.W.T. 2001, c. 13 (Northwest Territories);
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capacity and legality) when they are expressed in electronic form. In s. 19 of
Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act, for example:
An offer, the acceptance of an offer, or any matter that is material to
the formation or operation of a contract may be expressed,
(a) by means of electronic information or an electronic document; or by
an act that is intended to result in electronic communication, such as,
(i) touching or clicking of an appropriate icon or other place on a
computer screen; or (ii) speaking.191
Furthermore, in s. 19(2):
A contract is not invalid or unenforceable by reason only of being in
electronic form.192
Smart contracts must also satisfy any other requirements imposed by specialized
statutes and regulations, depending on the nature of the contracts themselves
(e.g. consumer protection or real-estate brokerage rules). Thus, if a smart
contract satisfies these requirements, its electronic form itself does not render it
invalid.
However, as observed by Reggie O’Shields, ‘‘[o]ne area that may be
especially tricky for smart contracts is showing ‘mutual assent’ to the
contract.”193 Indeed, how is ‘‘mutual assent” — which is ‘‘traditionally based
on the concepts of offer and acceptance by the parties”194 — achieved if smart
contracts use artificial intelligence to enter into agreements for the parties? David
C. Vladeck notes that while the enabling technologies ‘‘have no attribute of legal
personhood... [t]hey are agents or instruments of other entities that have legal
capacity as individuals, corporations, or other legal persons that may be held
accountable under the law.”195 This is certainly the case under Ontario’s
Electronic Commerce Act, where the technologies enabling the formation of
smart contract would fall under the definition of ‘‘electronic agent” meaning ‘‘a
computer program or any other electronic means used to initiate an act or to
respond to electronic documents or acts, in whole or in part, without review by
an individual at the time of the response or act.”196 Section 21 stipulates that
valid contracts ‘‘may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an
individual or by the interaction of electronic agents.”197 Thus, as long as a certain
Electronic Commerce Act, N.S.S. 2001, c. 26 (Nova Scotia); Electronic Commerce Act,
S.N.U. 2004, c. 7.1 (Nunavut); Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 66 (Yukon).
191 ECA, supra note 130 at s. 19 .
192 Ibid. at s. 19(2).
193 O’Shields, supra note 187 at 185.
194 Ibid. at 186.
195 David C. Vladeck, ‘‘Machines without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence” (2014) 89 Wash. L. Rev. 117 at 121.
196 ECA, supra note 130 at s. 1(1) [emphasis added].
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technology falls under the umbrella of ‘‘electronic agents,” multiple agents can
enter into contracts for respective parties. In the following section, I explore
blockchain, smart contracts, and AI in greater detail.
A) Blockchain, Smart Contracts, And Artificial Intelligence
1) Blockchain
Three technologies are attracting much of the attention in current literature:
(1) blockchain; (2) smart contracts; and (3) artificial intelligence. First, a so-
called blockchain is a real-time ledger of data or information, whose existence is
confirmed by members of a peer-to-peer network.198 As explained by Debbie
Ginsberg, ‘‘[b]lockchains can take any information — from simple ledgers to
complex contracts — and store it online in containers called ‘blocks.’ These
blocks are then encrypted... [and] only users who have the key can read the
information.”199 Although the information contained in each block can only be
accessed by parties with an encrypted key, the history of all transactions is
‘‘public, accessible, and widely distributed across the whole network of users.”200
As noted by Max Raskin, blockchain is unique as information can be
permanently stored and updated without any central authority: ‘‘[i]nformation
already contained in a verified blockchain cannot be overwritten without
consensus with the entire network to propagate the altered information.”201 In
short, as it pertains to contract law, blockchain contracts are transactional in
nature, anonymous — but nevertheless verifiable — and can be entered into by
multiple parties without a central authority. Blockchain, itself, does not interfere
with party autonomy, but is merely a platform for contracting.
2) Smart Contracts
Blockchain is most commonly utilized in so-called smart contracts. Smart
contracts, also known as self-executing contracts, blockchain contracts, or digital
contracts, are binding contracts whose terms and conditions are programmed
into computer code, allowing for the self-execution of the contract upon a
specified performance.202 As explained by Lisa A. Peters: ‘‘if the rules and or
197 Ibid. at s. 21.
198 Raskin, supra note 187 at 317.
199 Debbie Ginsberg, ‘‘Blockchain 3.0 or Web 3. No?” 22 A.A.L.L. Spectrum 36 at 37.
200 Benito Arrunada, ‘‘Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver Interpersonal Exchange” (2018)
19:1 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 55 at 59. See also O’Shields, supra note 187 at 180 (‘‘Each
transaction, or block, is authenticated by a networkof computers before it is added to the
chain of all prior transactions... The blockchain, or distributed ledger, is open and
transparent for all to see, although addresses shown do not necessarily indicate the
person to whom the address is associated, as the system is also designed to be
anonymous”).
201 Raskin, supranote 187 at 318. See alsoHoriaMirceaBotos, ‘‘ABlockchain ‘Intelligence’
Analysis” 13 Res. & Sci. Today 42 at 44 (‘‘Because of its data storing and... use of nodes,
the data does not risk centralization or corruption”).
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conditions (programmed into the code) are met, the contract self-executes, but if
the rules are broken or unfulfilled, an error returns and no activity occurs.”203
Nevertheless, before a smart contract can self-execute, the agreed upon terms and
conditions of the contract must be converted into so-called contractware, defined
‘‘as the physical or digital instantiations of contract terms into machines or other
property involved in the performance of the contract [where instantiations] mean
taking the terms of the agreement and either writing them into previously
existing software or writing them into software that is connected in some way to
a machine that implements the contract.”204 Smart contracts ‘‘work in concert
with blockchain technology”205 because the ‘‘terms of the contract and state of
facts relating to the performance of the contract can be programmed into a
decentralized blockchain that cannot be overridden by any individual malicious
or mistaken node.”206 Offers can therefore be programed into a blockchain,
where acceptance would be achieved via performance.207 In short, it is the
combination of contractware and blockchain technology that distinguishes smart
contracts from other electronic or ‘‘click-wrap” agreements. Unlike other
agreements, ‘‘the digital code is not just a representation of the agreement, it is
the agreement.”208 For Alexander Savelyev, this means that smart contracts are
self-executing, instantaneous, and perhaps one day, self-enforceable.209
3) Artificial Intelligence
A third but interrelated technology attracting much of the attention in
current literature is artificial intelligence or (‘‘AI”). AI can be thought of as a
process of ‘‘machine learning,” whereby a computer processor, programed to
complete a task using an algorithm, can improve its algorithm and ultimately its
performance, by reviewing or interacting with real-world data or examples.210 In
202 See Jerry I-H Hsiao, ‘‘Smart Contract on the Blockchain-Paradigm Shift for Contract
Law” (2017) 14 US-China L. Rev. 685 at 685-86. See also Kevin D.Werbach &Nicolas
Cornell, ‘‘Contracts Ex Machina” (2017) 67 Duke L.J. 313.
203 Lisa A. Peters, ‘‘Contract Law Update: Developments of Note” Lawson Lundell L.L.P.
(9 November 2017), online: <www.lawsonlundell.com/assets/htmldocuments/
2017%20Contract%20Law%20Update.pdf>.
204 Raskin, supra note 187 at 307.
205 O’Shields, supra note 187 at 181.
206 Raskin, supra note 187 at 319.
207 Ibid. at 322.
208 Peters, supra note 203 at 31.
209 Savelyev, supra note 12 at 126-27.
210 See Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, ‘‘The Dawn of Fully Automated Contract
Drafting: Machine Learning Breathes New Life into a Decades-Old Promise” (2016)
15:1 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 216 at 224 [Betts & Jaep]. See also Maruerite E. Gerstner,
‘‘Liability Issues withArtificial Intelligence Software” (1993) 33 Santa Clara L. Rev. 239
at 242 (‘‘Artificial intelligence programs utilize the knowledge of the relationship
between objects and events in a particular focused problem area (the ‘domain’) as the
basis for problem solving. Rather than using a mathematical algorithm to manipulate
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other words, ‘‘after processing enough successive examples, a machine learning
program can teach itself to identify new examples to better fit the user’s
liking.”211 Applications of AI in law come in many forms, including: document
review, due diligence, e-discovery, productivity analytics, and legal decision
making.212 More recently, there have been attempts to combine AI with
blockchain and smart contracts, where AI would be used to identify and code
standard terms and conditions.213 In contract law, more specifically, AI is also
increasingly being used for contract analytics.214 The following exert from Betts
and Jaep illustrates how AI can be applied to make contracting more efficient:
An algorithm learns which contractual language and which provisions
are ‘standard,’ that is, which language and provisions appear most
frequently. Once the algorithm understands standard versus nonstan-
dard language, it then internally sorts contracts based on the degree to
which each contract conforms to or departs from the standard
language. Based on this analysis, the software is able to identify a
single ‘standard’ document that contains the least amount of deal-
specific, non-standard language available. When later creating model
forms to be used in the drafting process, the algorithm [can] start its
document creation processes from the contracts that most conform
with what it understands to be standard language. In situations without
standard contracts, the algorithm is able to aggregate standard clauses
from across multiple contracts to approximate a single standard
document.215
Nevertheless, the adoption and sophistication of AI technology today remains
limited. The most common criticism of AI technology is that common sense
data, AI depends on the ‘symbolic manipulation of information’ through the use of
heuristics. Unlike mathematical algorithms, heuristics do not always ‘work’ to give a
precise answer; theymerely offer a ‘clue’ to the solution. It is by combining all useful ideas
or clues and having adequate knowledge about the problem domain that the solution is
obtained”); Mik, supra note 14 at 364 (‘‘websites can be customised to match the
cognitive preferences of specific individuals and, and... entiremarketing strategies can be
designed to target specific persons based on their idiosyncrasies (and frequently hidden)
desires and vulnerabilities”).
211 Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 224.
212 See Lauritsen, ‘‘Marketing Real Lawyers,” supra note 13 at 68 (‘‘Whether it’s ‘bots’ that
fix parking tickets, online apps that generate formpackages for self-represented litigants,
or suites of software that perform deep analysis of document collections for e-discovery,
contract analysis, or due diligence purposes, intelligent systems are starting to show up
everywhere”).
213 See e.g. Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 219 (‘‘Many [smart contracts] require the user to
create a ‘coded’ contract by uploading and coding a preexisting contract.... some
programs code them automatically through artificial ‘‘AI”).
214 See e.g. George G. Triantis, ‘‘Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology,
and Innovation in Contract Design” (2013) 18:2 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 177 at 183 ff.
(‘‘Only in very rare cases is full customization cost-effective”).
215 Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 227.
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reasoning and perception — those skills that are of a naturally human character
— ‘‘are by far the most difficult for AI.”216 Also, as noted by Eliza Mik above,
AI promises to interfere with contractual autonomy in unprecedented ways.217
Despite these criticisms, many believe that the initial applications of AI to legal
practice are just the early beginnings of what will be a radical technology-based
disruption and ‘‘the transformative impacts of AI on legal practice will continue
to accelerate going forward.”218 One survey recently found 36% of U.S. law
firms with 50 or more lawyers and 90% of U.S. law firms with 1000 or more
lawyers are ‘‘either currently using or actively explore use of AI systems.”219
B) Proponents Of Adopting Technology Into Contract Law
Proponents of adopting technology into contract law are excited for three
main reasons: (1) anticipated increases in certainty or predictability; (2)
anticipated increases in economic efficiency realized through the
standardization and automation of the contracting process; and (3) anticipated
reductions in third party intervention (e.g. government regulation) enhancing
contractual freedom.
1) Certainty And Predictability
First, proponents argue that technology can make contracting more certain
and predictable by removing ambiguities that are inherent in human
interactions.220 The major premise underlying this position is that ‘‘[c]ontracts
must be legally certain in order to be enforceable”221 or ‘‘the contract must be
sufficiently certain in terms of both inherent clarity and completeness in order to
bind.”222 As explained by Savelyev, technology can promote certainty and
predictability since ‘‘a Smart contract has software code in its core [and] its terms
are expressed as one of the available computer languages, which are rather
formal languages in their substance, with strictly defined semantics and syntax
[and so] computer language does not allow discretion in its interpretation.”223 As
216 Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Law,” supra note 13 at 1959.
217 Mik, supra note 14 at 364.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid. at 21 citingEricA. Seeger&Thomas S.Clay, ‘‘LawFirms inTransition:AnAltman
Weil Flash Survey” (2017). See also Sterling Miller, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and its
Impact on Legal Technology, Part I” Lexology (21 November 2017), online:
<www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2247a07-c36d-4894-b774-a76aa7705632>
(‘‘experts predict that spending on AI by companies will grow from $8 billion to $47 billion in
2020, up almost 600%”).
220 See e.g. Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, ‘‘The Promise — and Perils — of ‘Smart’
Contracts” Knowledge@Wharton, University of Pennsylvania (18 May 2017), online:
[Werbach & Cornell, ‘‘Promise and Perils”].
221 Mark Giancaspro, ‘‘Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal
Perspective” (2017) 33 Computer L. & Security Rev. 825 at 831.
222 Ibid.
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observed by George G. Triantis, the associated clarity of terms that is typical of
smart contracts has benefits at both the negotiation and performance stages of
the contractual relationship. Parties can not only understand their duties better
with fewer ambiguities, but ‘‘can allocate enforceable rights with greater
confidence and anticipate the likely outcome of possible litigation.”224
2) Economic Efficiency From Standardization And Automation
Second, proponents argue that the standardization and automation of
contracts achieved by technology can translate into real-world savings for
lawyers and their clients.225 Standardization of the contracting process refers to
the ‘‘ability to redeploy contract language across transactions and to share these
terms with other lawyers and professionals.”226 Proponents argue that
standardization ‘‘reduces costs at each of the contracting stages [including]
front-end, back-end, and midstream.”227 New applications of AI, for example,
allow the drafter of a contract to quickly access relevant and standardized
contract terms that reduce the costs of reading, research, negotiation, and
drafting on the front-end.228 On the back-end and midstream, standard terms are
typically easier for the parties to understand as they are ‘‘more likely to have
been interpreted and enforced in prior litigation.”229 Once a benchmark of
standard terms has been established, AI can also be used to recognize clauses or
specific language diverging from the benchmark, allowing lawyers ‘‘to focus their
effort on the most important and idiosyncratic aspects of the contract.”230
On the other hand, automation refers to the ability to self-execute one or
more parts of the contracting process, whether front-end, back-end, or
midstream. Proponents argue that automation promises to make contractual
relationships ‘‘more efficient and economical with potentially fewer
opportunities for error, delay or dispute.”231 These efficiencies would largely
223 Savelyev, supra note 12 at 125 (‘‘Smart contract terms are interpreted bymachine on the
basis of Boolean logic, in contrast to classic contracts, where interpretation of terms is
performed by the human brain on the basis of subjective criteria and analogous ways of
thinking. Thus the precision of programming languages is able to reduce possible
problems associatedwith unpredictable interpretation of contractual terms by a party to
the contract or an enforcement agency. Although ambiguity may exist in programming
languages, these ambiguities are less than in the real world because there are simply fewer
terms that a computer can recognize than those which a human being can recognize”).
224 Triantis, supra note 214 at 186-87.
225 See e.g. ibid. at 186-91.
226 Ibid. at 187.
227 Ibid. at 186.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid. at 187.
230 Ibid. at 190. See also Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 227 (‘‘In situations without standard
contracts, the algorithm is able to aggregate standard clauses from across multiple
contracts to approximate a single standard document”).
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be achieved by cutting the number of hours formerly devoted to administrative
logistics, such as the physical signing of documents, the filling and delivery of
notices, or the execution of payments under an agreement.232 Nonetheless, as
observed in a recent report by Linklaters L.L.P., ‘‘[n]ot all clauses are susceptible
to automation and self-execution.”233 Even for those clauses that are susceptible,
it may not always be desirable to do so. This report distinguished two types of
clauses that are found in most contracts: operational and non-operational
clauses.234 While operational clauses are structured by conditional logic — i.e.,
upon the occurrence of a specified event or time an action is required — non-
operational clauses are not structured by conditional logic and detail the wider
circumstances of the contractual relationship.235 Operational clauses are more
susceptible to automation for their use of conditional logic and are most
commonly found in financial contracts, such as a clause requiring a party to
transfer shares to the other party on a specified date. Non-operational clauses are
less susceptible to automation and include things like choice of forum,
arbitration, or entire agreement clauses.236 Nonetheless, as noted in the
Linklaters report and by others,237 specific language and expressions found in
non-operational clauses can be standardized and automated like operational
clauses.238 In turn, as noted by Mark Giancaspro, ‘‘automating a number of key
processes during the life of a contract translates to reduced human involvement...
[where] efficiency is likely to be improved.”239
231 Hsiao, supra note 202 at 685. See also Raskin, supra note 187 at 324 (‘‘Some of the most
difficult problems of early contract law involved defenses of misunderstanding and
mistake. With respect to interpretation, the use of computer code has the potential to
minimize future conflicts over terms. Although ambiguity certainly exists in program-
ming languages, these ambiguities are less than in the real world”).
232 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ‘‘Whitepaper: Smart Contracts
and Distributed Ledgers — A Legal Perspective” Linklaters L.L.P. (August 2017) 1 at
21, online: <www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
perspective.pdf>.
233 Ibid. at 10.
234 Ibid. at 10-12.
235 Ibid. at 10-11.
236 Ibid. at 11.
237 See e.g. Triantis, supra note 214 at 190-91.
238 See International Swaps andDerivatives Association, supra note 232 at 12 (‘‘it would be
possible to conceive of a world where a computer could understandwhat is meant by the
terms ‘party’, ‘duly organized’, ‘validly existing’, ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘organisation and
incorporation’, and could check automatically with relevant company registries whether
this representation is correct at the time it is given”). Note, however, the stipulated
limitations therein.
239 Giancaspro, supra note 221 at 827.
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3) Reduction In Third Party Intervention
Third, proponents argue that new technologies promise a reduction in third
party invention to contractual relationships, allowing for more contractual
freedom.240 Most commercial contracts today depend on some centralized
institution that serves as a trusted intermediary between parties, including
financial institutions such as banks for financial transactions; retailers who sell
goods to consumers originating from manufacturers; and websites or apps that
facilitate purchases.241 On the other hand, smart contracts utilizing blockchain
technology are characterized by anonymity and their decentralized nature.242
Because all transactions on a blockchain ledger are visible to the members of a
peer-to-peer network, this satisfies the verification function normally performed
by trusted intermediaries.243 Contracts could therefore be created and performed
without engaging any parties that are ancillary to the agreement.
Decentralization also brings anonymity as parties to an agreement are not
required to share any personal information with third parties such as credit card
companies or retailers.244 Since blockchain only recognizes encrypted keys of the
parties to an agreement, this has also been argued to reduce the risk of data theft
targeting intermediaries.245
C) Critics Of Adopting Technology Into Contract Law
Critics of adopting blockchain and artificial intelligence into contract law
often voice four main concerns: (1) unforeseen inefficiencies in the contracting
process; (2) unsuitability for more complex agreements and relationships; (3)
vulnerability to hacking and data theft; and (4) negative impacts on average
consumers. I explore each of these criticisms under the following sub-sections.
240 See e.g. Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola & Addi Rull, ‘‘Smart Contracts” in Tanel
Kerikmäe & Addi Rull, eds., The Future of Law and eTechnologies (Tallinn: Springer,
2016) at 134 (‘‘there is a paradigm shift in the practice of smart contracting, triggered by
technologies which enable transactions in a decentralized mode leaving different
intermediaries andmiddlemenaside”); Peters, supranote 203 at 31;Hsiao, supranote 202
at 685-86.
241 See ibid. at 685.
242 See Savelyev, supra note 12 at 117-18.
243 See ibid. See also Giancaspro, supra note 221 at 828.
244 See ibid.
245 See ibid. See also Christian-Vlad Oancea, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence Role in Cybersecurity
Infrastructures” (2015) 4 Int’l. J. Information Security & Cybercrime 59 at 59-60; Faye
Mitchell, ‘‘The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Digital Forensics: An Introduction”
(2010) 7Digital Evidence &Electronic Signature L. Rev. 35; Bohumir Stedron, ‘‘Law or
Artificial Intelligence?NewTrends in theData Protection” (2007) 1MasarykUniversity
J.L. & Tech. 209.
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1) Unforeseen Inefficiencies In The Contracting Process
First, critics argue that blockchain and/or artificial intelligence introduce
new inefficiencies in the contracting process that are not always accounted for by
proponents of the technologies. As recently observed by Jeremy M. Sklaroff,
‘‘[f]rom a purely technical standpoint, they may be right. However, shifting away
from human-language contracts creates new inefficiencies.”246 Related to the
issue of inefficiency, critics tend to point to — among other criticisms — the
relative inflexibility of updating contract terms once they are uploaded to the
blockchain,247 the need to convert written terms into computer code before
contracting,248 the need to pay IT specialists to code terms,249 the need to train
lawyers and administrative personnel,250 and a potential for new coding
errors.251 Together, these shortfalls amount to ancillary costs and risks that
detract from technology’s appeal.
2) Unsuitability For Complex Agreements And Relationships
Second, critics argue that the applications of blockchain and artificial
intelligence in contract law are largely limited to simple contracts that are based
on conditional logic and unsuitable for more complex agreements and
relationships. As noted by Werbach and Cornell, ‘‘[t]he reality is, even though
we think machines can render contracts effectively, there are lots of situations
where they cannot.”252 There are several reasons why this may be the case.
Perhaps most notably, ‘‘certain legal terms would seem incapable of being
formally represented in a non-ambiguous way (whether as Boolean logic or some
wider formalism) because of their ultimately subjective nature.”253 Thus, if a
term requires performance to be carried out in ‘good faith’ or in a ‘commercially
reasonable’ manner, it is harder and arguably counterproductive to express that
246 Jeremy M. Sklaroff, ‘‘Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility” (2017) U. Pa. L.
Rev. 263 at 263-64 (‘‘By eliminating this flexibility, smart contracting will impose costs
that are more severe and intractable than the ones it seeks to solve”).
247 See e.g. ibid. at 264, 291; Betts & Jaep, supra note 211 at 222 (‘‘When the underlying law
changes or other events occur, lawyersmust adapt to new formats or include entirely new
types of contractual clauses. To keep up with such changes, lawyers will need to
periodically re-code form documents, and may need to perform their own diligence to
make sure that the drafting software’s logic tree and output reflect their jurisdiction’s
most recent law”).
248 See e.g. Sklaroff, supra note 246 at 291; Tsui S. Ng., ‘‘Blockchain and Beyond: Smart
Contracts” (2017) 1 Bus. L. Today 1 at 2; Gerstner, supra note 210 at 244.
249 See e.g. Hsiao, supra note 202 at 691.
250 See e.g. Giancaspro, supra note 221 at 833 (‘‘As smart contracts are increasingly used,
lawyers may need to gain a basic proficiency in coding [which] is a time-consuming
process”); Gerstner, supra note 209 at 244.
251 For a thorough discussion of technology-related errors in contracting, see ibid. at 244.
252 Werbach & Cornell, ‘‘Promise and Perils,” supra note 220 at 3.
253 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, supra note 232 at 12.
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term in computer code.254 This is because law has many unique characteristics
making it especially challenging for automation.255 As observed by Rissland:
[W]hat counts as an ‘answer’ in the law is not clearcut [and] is also
different from other disciplines. In law there is usually no unique right
answer; rather there are reasonable alternative answers, more a matter
of degree than of extremes. The answers are highly contextual, depend
on goals and points of view, and change as the law evolves. Even the
rule-based aspects of legal reasoning cannot be modeled with purely
deductive methods.256
Moreover, where a complex agreement or relationship could be automated
on the blockchain, Betts and Jaep found that experienced lawyers may ‘‘refuse to
use the software”257 because it leaves them without much control over the
finalized legal provisions, raising concerns about compliance and accuracy, and
because they may be hesitant to invest in automation training out of fear of
losing billables.258
3) Vulnerability To Hacking And Data Theft
Third, critics argue that contracting through blockchain and/or artificial
intelligence leaves personal and confidential information vulnerable to hacking
and data theft. Smart contracts, for example, are vulnerable in at least two ways.
First, because computer code is used to automate smart contracts, they are
‘‘automatically subject to various flaws and bugs which may accompany any
254 See ibid. at 12-13 (‘‘it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive all the possible
permutations that might occur in the future with respect to a legal relationship between
two parties. For clarity’s sake, there is clearly a benefit in spending some time and effort
in trying to predict, and explicitly provide for, the most likely permutations. At some
point, though, the cost-benefit analysis starts to look less favourable. It is here that a
lawyer often reaches for a more sweeping fallback position, such as certain determina-
tionshaving tobemade in good faith anda commercially reasonablemanner, or is simply
silent on the matter. In either case, the contracting parties are relying on the fact that the
courts couldbe relied upon toprovide a contextual interpretationof how the issue should
be resolved, informed by the long-standing bedrock of legal principle”).
255 See Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Law,” supra note 13 at 1961 (‘‘1. Legal
reasoning ismulti-modal, rich and varied: it includes reasoningwith cases, rules, statutes
and principles; 2. Case law has an explicit style and standard of reasoning and
justification: stare decisis. 3. Specialized legal knowledge, such as cases and statutory
rules, is well-documented and available frommany sources... 4. The law is self-aware and
self-critical, and has an established tradition of examining its processes and assumptions.
There is lively debate between proponents of competing jurisprudential schools. 5. The
character of answers in the law is different from those in many other disciplines: answers
aremuchmore amatter of degree than clear-cut yes-or-noand they can changeover time.
6. The knowledge used in legal reasoning is diverse, ranging from common sense to
specialized legal knowledge”).
256 Ibid. at 1962.
257 Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 221.
258 Ibid.
180 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [17 C.J.L.T.]
computer program.”259 In June 2016, Ethereum, a global blockchain platform,
was hacked for an estimated value of $47 million.260 What is noteworthy about
this incident is that the hackers had exploited a coding error that governed a
smart contract, rather than hacking an encryption code.261 Accordingly, as
compared to written contracts, smart contracts on blockchain remain vulnerable
to human misjudgment in the coding of the contracts. A second form of
vulnerability is related to the inherent risks of sharing personal and/or
confidential information in the formation of smart contracts.262 As noted by
Giancaspro, ‘‘[u]tilizing smart contracts necessarily involves digitizing the
entirety of the transaction between the parties, which arguably exposes them
to greater risk of sensitive information being compromised.”263 This
vulnerability exists when contractual terms and information are being shared,
coded, and uploaded on blockchain, although they are encrypted when they are
uploaded.264 As explained above and echoed recently, ‘‘distributed ledgers are
not vulnerable to a single point failure. To be successful, a cyber-attack would
need to not only infiltrate one user; it would have to attack multiple copies of the
record held across the network.”265
4) Negative Impacts On Average Consumers
Lastly, critics argue that contracting through blockchain and/or artificial
intelligence negatively impacts consumers by increasing the contractual distance
and inequality of bargaining power between consumers and retailers, and by
rendering consumers’ personal information vulnerable.266
The ease with which goods can be purchased using [electronic agents]
facilitates a contracting environment in which quick purchases without
contract review are the norm, thereby further incentivizing consumers
to fail to read an understand contract terms. In turn, this encourages
businesses to continue to take advantage of consumer ignorance by
including one-sided contract terms that impede the ability of consumers
to obtain legal redress and may even lead to contractual abuse.267
259 See Savelyev, supra note 12 at 126.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 See e.g. Mark Giancaspro, supra note 221 at 833.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 AllensL.L.P.&Linklaters L.L.P.,BlockchainReaction:Understanding theOpportunities
and Navigating the Legal Frameworks of Distributed Ledger Technology and Blockchain
(2016), online: <www.allens.com.au/general/forms/pdf/blockchainreport.pdf?s-
ku=fsdah5e556eqweqwg>.
266 See e.g. Elvy, supra note 39 at 839-45.
267 Ibid. at 844.
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For example, Amazon Echo’s terms of use allow Amazon to unilaterally amend
the agreement and contain warranty disclaimers, class action and jury waivers,
and a mandatory arbitration provision that excludes small claims.268 Another
Canadian example of consumer-related abuse was recently heard at the Supreme
Court in Douez v. Facebook, Inc., where the Court evoked public policy concerns
and applied the doctrine of unconscionability to render unenforceable a
unilateral forum selection clause that was contained in an online consumer
adhesion contract.269 Stacy-Ann Elvy argues that advances in contract
automation and standardization, coupled with the growing Internet of Things
(‘‘IOT”), are expected to worsen pre-existing information asymmetry in
consumer contracts, grow the contractual distance between consumers and the
contract formation process, further encourage consumers to avoid reading and
understanding contractual terms, and encourage businesses to use unilateral
amendment provisions and restrictive forum selection provisions as a standard
practice.270
There are also concerns that contracting through blockchain and/or artificial
intelligence renders consumers’ personal information vulnerable to exploitation.
AI, for example, is premised on the idea that a user’s behaviours, habits, and
lifestyle information can all be used to make tools more targeted and efficient.
Accordingly, in the consumer context, critics are worried that AI with the
growing IOT will give businesses unprecedented access to consumers’ personal
information.271 As argued by Elvy, ‘‘IOT devices will be able to measure and
monitor their environment, goods, and consumers in real time and provide status
data, location data, and actionable data.” This issue is compounded by the
reality that IOT devices from different providers are increasingly connected,
meaning that manufacturers and retailers are able to transmit consumer data
between themselves. One recent example of such a partnership is the
announcement by Ford to partner with Amazon to connect their vehicles to
IOT home devices like Amazon Echo.272 While Canadian privacy statutes allow
for the transmission and sharing of anonymized personal information,273 as
268 Ibid.
269 Douez, supra note 24 at paras 104, 112.
270 Elvy, supra note 39 at 839.
271 Ibid. at 845 (‘‘With the dawn of the IOT, companies will gain access to lifestyle and
consumption rate data. IOT devices can also generate health-related and biometric data
about consumers, such as temperature, heart rate, hemoglobin levels, blood pressure,
blood flow levels, fingerprint scans, voice patterns, and scans of retinas”) citing Scott R.
Peppet, ‘‘Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimina-
tion, Privacy, Security, and Consent” (2014) 93 Tex. L. Rev. 85 at 88, 100, 139.
272 SeeMarco dellaCava, ‘‘FordPartnerswithAmazon toConnectCarswithHomes”USA
Today (5 January 2016), online: <www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/01/05/ford-
working-amazon-boost–car-links/78284584/>.
273 See e.g. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5,
Schedule 1 at s. 4.5.3 (‘‘Personal information that is no longer required to fulfil the
identified purposes should be destroyed, erased, or made anonymous. Organizations
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argued by Scott Peppet, it is next to impossible to anonymize IOT data and its
implications for single consumers.274 Thus, while new technology creates a need
for social inclusion, it also creates a need for exclusion:
The modern order is one in which the combination of exponentially
growing populations and increasingly sophisticated, invasive technol-
ogies, creates demands for abstract rights not just to social inclusion and
respect from one’s peers (the traditional preserve of the law of
defamation) but also social exclusion — the right to be ‘let alone’ or
‘forgotten’ by one’s fellow man. The gradual introduction of such rights
in most jurisdictions in recent years is a reaction to a more intrusive age
and to new technologies.275
4. MOVING FORWARD
Having explored some emerging contract technologies in Part 2 (B), as well
as the history, theory, and modern sources of equity in Part 2 (A), I now turn to a
deeper discussion of the nexus between equitable principles and reasoning,
emerging technologies and contract law in Canada. In this section, I explore four
propositions for modernizing Canadian contract law by giving equitable
principles larger roles in provincial statutes: (1) inserting increasingly relevant
equitable principles into statute; (2) moving toward generalist equitable statutes
not limited to specialized contracts; (3) making legislative reform quicker and
more adaptable to technological change; and finally, (4) refocusing the study of
equitable reasoning in law school and professional licensing curricula.
A) Inserting Increasingly Relevant Equitable Principles Into Statute
The starting point for this analysis involves recognizing that new
technologies will — at the very least — continue to challenge courts,
legislatures, and academics to address growing concerns about information
asymmetry in modern contracting. Professors DiMatteo, Atiyah, and Elvy have
indeed all predicted that ‘‘the rapid advancement of technology will apply
pressure on courts and legislatures to intercede under the banner of fairness or
justice in exchange.”276 We have also seen that historically, ‘‘[t]he full
shall develop guidelines and implement procedures to govern the destruction of personal
information”).
274 Peppet, supra note 271 at 156.
275 Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System,” supra note 38 at 7 [emphasis added].
276 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xii. See also Atiyah, ‘‘Fair
Exchange,” supra note 35 at 17 (‘‘By now I have, I hope adduced enough evidence to
suggest that it is no longer possible to accept without serious qualification the idea that
the law is today solely concernedwith the bargaining process and not with the result. For
one thing, I have cast doubt on the reality of this distinction, and for another, I have cited
evidence suggesting a real concern with substantive fairness”); Elvy, supra note 39 at 854
(‘‘This article suggests thatArticle 2 should be amended to safeguard consumers and that
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enforcement of contract as dictated by a cold application of freedom of contract
[was] modified in the twentieth century by the countervailing principle of fairness
of the exchange”277 and that there was a ‘‘an expansion in the use of equitable
principles by the courts.”278
If — as argued in Parts 1 and 2 of this article and supported by the likes of
Henry E. Smith and Stacy-Ann Elvy — equitable principles are particularly well
suited for offsetting injustices created by new technologies, what kinds of
principles should be recognized and in which sources of law? First, as
encountered in earlier Parts of this article, a strong case can be made that
issues related to information asymmetry in contract law are more likely to be
addressed through statutes rather than common law rules — and perhaps
rightfully so for a number of reasons. For example, Atiyah noted that in Canada,
‘‘the area within which the pure doctrines of the common law actually operate
are continuously being confined by the ever-encroaching tide of statute law; and
when it comes to statutes nobody feels the least inhibition about trying to ensure
that contracts should actually be, in some sense, fair.”279 In other words, for
Atiyah, statutes may be more receptive to changes placing a greater focus on the
substantive fairness of contracts rather than ensuring procedural fairness.280 This
also serves as a response to critics who may argue that courts and common law
rules are more adaptable change, which, on its surface, may be true, but may be
less suited for larger-scale efforts of promoting substantive fairness. Changes at
the statutory level are also closer in-line to Beniger’s theoretical insights
[discussed in Part 2 (A)(b)], whereby technological changes are followed by
‘‘crises of control” and addressed via public processes of centralization and
bureaucratization.281
Addressing issues of information asymmetry through statutes makes sense
for a handful of other reasons. As noted by Henry E. Smith, statutory rules — as
opposed to common law rules — are purpose driven and their interpretation may
be better suited for the ‘‘openness”282 of equity, which ‘‘looks to the spirit rather
than the letter of the law... [and] is more outward looking — to morality, custom,
common sense — than the regular more formal parts of the law.”283 Moreover,
as discussed in Part 2 (A)(C), equitable principles and reasoning are closer
courts should adjust their application of existing contract law and agency principles to
account for the new, automatic, and interface-free contracting environments by
considering the increased levels of information asymmetry and the growing distance
between consumers, contract terms, and the contract formation process”).
277 DiMatteo, ‘‘Modification of Contract,” supra note 2 at 270.
278 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at xiii.
279 Atiyah, ‘‘Fair Exchange,” supra note 35 at 17
280 Ibid. at 2-3.
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aligned to the most recent trends of ‘‘smart regulation” that is goal based and
‘‘does not specify the means of achieving compliance, but sets out goals that
allow alternative ways to achieve [it],”284 or regulating behaviour through a series
of broader aspirational goals and standards that are closely related to equitable
principles. Further, also discussed in Part 2 (A)(c), when courts create new rules
that incorporate some form of equitable principles, they often take the form of
what Henry E. Smith referred to as — ‘‘multi-factor balancing tests”285 that are
characterized by a broader policy or proportionality analysis.286 This is the case
because, as explained by Arvind and Gray, ‘‘courts are increasingly faced with
actions arising out of heavily regulated relationships, in which their ability to
deploy the traditional common law tests is necessarily coloured by the need to
engage with the aims, goals, and policies underlying the relevant regulations, the
majority of which are systemic and consequentialist.”287 Accordingly, questions
arise whether modern courts — creating broad policy and proportionality tests in
the common law — are best suited (both practically and morally) to make these
decisions,288 ‘‘call[ing] into question many of the theoretical assumptions that are
taken for granted in contemporary private law scholarship.” Finally, doctrinal
duties in common law doctrines may be easier to avoid than statutory duties by
strong contracting parties. Consider, for example, the new general (doctrinal)
duty of honesty in contractual performance. The Supreme Court in Bhasin v.
Hrynew289 noted that while ‘‘the parties are not free to exclude it [by
contract],”290 depending on the context, the parties are free ‘‘to relax the
requirements of the doctrine so long as they respect its minimum core
requirements.”291 However, it may be more difficult (i.e., fewer contexts) in
which contractors could stipulate relaxations of statutory rules since they are
interpreted in a purposeful manner. For example, consumer protection acts in
Canada explicitly forbid parties to waive any substantive or procedural rights
recognized under the acts.292 It is unlikely that the parties could relax any of
these rights because they were adopted precisely for protecting consumers against
such encroachments. In short, though, even if statutes are better suited for
tackling these issues, as noted by Arvind and Gray, common law will continue to
play a crucial role in interpreting and applying statutory duties. Common law
would still play a crucial role in interpreting and applying new statutory
duties.293
284 Hanebury, supra note 143 at 45.
285 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 188.
286 Ibid.
287 Arvind & Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy,” supra note 144 at 237.
288 Ibid.
289 Bhasin, supra note 28.
290 Ibid. at para 75.
291 Ibid. at para 77.
292 CPA 2002, supra note 125, s. 7 (Ontario).
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Second, what kinds of principles should be recognized for addressing the
problem? In this section, I explore the feasibility of inserting four equity-based
principles into modern statutes: (1) prohibiting unilateral amendment provisions
in consumer contracts; (2) prohibiting the disclosure of terms and conditions post
contract formation in consumer contracts; (3) prohibiting the waiver of
consumers’ rights to bring class action proceedings in consumer contracts; and
(4) prohibiting self-executory performance without constructive notice in
consumer contracts. These propositions would initially fall under each
province’s consumer protection laws as unconscionable and unfair practices.
In the following sections, I will explore each of these four propositions in greater
detail.
1) Prohibiting Unilateral Amendment Provisions In Consumer Contracts
First, consumer protection laws across Canada should explicitly prohibit the
enforceability of unilateral amendment provisions in consumer contracts, ‘‘where
the use such provisions would permit amendments that are detrimental to
consumer rights.”294 A unilateral amendment or change-of-terms provision — as
the name suggests — is a contractual term that was agreed to by a contractee at
the time of contract formation, ‘‘providing for a right of the merchant to
unilaterally modify the fees or other essential terms during the course of a
consumer contract (without further consent).”295 For example, a unilateral
amendment provision could remove a small claims court option for the
consumer, decrease the time that a consumer has to bring a claim, or change
the agreed forum.296 Currently, consumer protection laws across Canada do not
make direct or explicit references to the validity of such provisions, although they
may be captured by broader rules against unconscionable representations — for
example — where ‘‘the consumer transaction is excessively one-side in favour of
someone other than the consumer”297 or ‘‘the terms of the consumer transaction
are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable.”298 Nevertheless, as argued
by Stacy-Ann Elvy and others,299 there is value in including explicit consumer
protection rules prohibiting unilateral amendments.
293 Arvind & Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy,” supra note 144 at 250.
294 Elvy, supra note 39 at 913-914.
295 Sidney Elbaz & Christian Abouchaker, ‘‘Restrictions to Unilateral Contractual
Amendments... and to Punitive Damages” McMillan L.L.P. (July 2014), online:
<mcmillan.ca/Restrictions-to-Unilateral-contractual-amendments-and-to-punitive-
damages>. Note that unilateral amendment provisions are not limited to consumer
contracts.
296 Elvy, supra note 39 at 914, 882.
297 Ibid, s. 15(2)(e).
298 Ibid, s. 15(2)(f).
299 Elvy, supra note 39 at 913-914. See also Peter A. Alces, ‘‘They Can Do What!?
Limitations on theUse ofChange-of-TermsClauses” (2012) 26:4Ga. St.U. L.Rev. 1099
at 1107-08.
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The consumer context in Canada is already characterized by high levels of
asymmetry and contract distancing.300 Moreover, as argued by Elvy, the
unprecedented ability of new technologies to generate IOT data about
consumers, as well as enter into contracts autonomously for the parties, is
expected to ‘‘worsen preexisting information asymmetry in consumer contracts
to the benefit of companies; increase the lack of proximity between consumers
and the contract formation process; further encourage consumers’ failure to read
and understand contract terms prior to contracting; and likely lead businesses to
further take advantage of consumer ignorance and apathy by including one-sided
contract terms, such as unilateral amendment provisions.”301 In such a context, it
is thus important to prohibit these provisions as consumers should not be
expected and ‘‘should not bear the burden of conducting investigations and
routinely checking a company’s website to determine if the terms of and
conditions [of their contract] have been amended.”302 Moreover, as noted by the
Supreme Court in Douez and reiterated by Elvy, whereas consumers once had
multiple options to choose from, market concentration and the importance of
certain products and services (e.g. social media platforms like Facebook and
LinkedIn, word processors, and electronic payment systems) leaves consumers
without a genuine choice or alternative in the contracting process.303 As noted by
Elvy, ‘‘[h]igh levels of information asymmetry favoring sellers can lead to gross
inequalities in bargaining power, and where this is combined with contract terms
that heavily benefit the party with superior bargaining power, such as unilateral
amendment rights, it may confirm indications that the consumer did not assent
to the contract or had no real meaningful choice.”304 The benefits of adding
explicit rules against unilateral amendments in consumer protection laws would
not only include — as argued indirectly by Martin A. Hogg — ‘‘furnish[ing]
[consumers] with a single starting point for understanding their rights, duties,
and remedies, in order to apply them to their specific circumstances,”305 but
would also serve as deterrence for companies to evoke these terms, rather than
having a policy of including them on a prima facie basis and only debating their
300 See Teresa Scassa, Michael E. Deturbide & C.C.H. Canada Limited, Electronic
Commerce and Internet Law in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: C.C.H. Canadian Limited,
2012) at ch. 2; Canada, Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Commerce and
Consumers, Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic Commerce: a Canadian
Framework (Ottawa: TheWorking Group, 1999); See also Mik, supra note 14 at 363-68
(for consumer protection trends in the American context).
301 Elvy, supra note 39 at 839, 844.
302 Ibid. at 913-14.
303 Douez, supranote 24 at para 56,Karakatsanis,Wagner&Gascon JJ.; Elvy, supranote 39
at 914.
304 Ibid.
305 MartinA.Hogg, ‘‘Codificationof PrivateLaw: ScotsLawat theCrossroadsofCommon
and Civil Law” in Barker, Fairweather & Grantham, eds., Private Law in the 21st
Century, supra note 14 at 109.
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validity in the event of litigation. Explicit references would likewise help to clarify
the law around unilateral amendments in consumer contracts, which is a hotly
debated subject at the moment.306
Other jurisdictions have already adopted rules prohibiting unilateral
amendment provisions in consumer contracts. In the European Union, for
example, Directive 93/13/EEC establishes rules for consumer contracts. Under
article 3(3), Annex 1(j), ‘‘[a] contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if... [it enables] the seller or supplier to alter
the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified in
the contract.”307 This is a contextual analysis taking into account ‘‘at the time of
conclusion of the contract ... all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the
contract”308 and the invalidity of one or more unfair terms does not render the
entire agreement invalid or unenforceable.309 While neither the Uniform
Commercial Code310 nor the Restatement (Second) of Contracts311 in the
United States contain any explicit provisions dealing with unilateral
amendments, there are recent efforts to modernize these sources,312 although
they have been met with conflicting attitudes in jurisprudence.313 In Canada,
consumer protection legislation would likely classify these rules under
unconscionable representations, which, according to section 17(2) of the
Ontario CPA, constitute unfair practices. Consumers would have the right,
under section 18(1), to rescind agreements after giving notice to their intention to
do so within one year of entering into the agreement per section 18(3). Under
such a proposal, a merchant would be required to obtain fresh consent when
amending the terms of a contract.
306 See e.g. Charles-Antoine Péladeau & Frédéric Wilson, ‘‘Consumer Law: the Court of
Appeal Reviews the Validity of Unilateral Amendment Stipulations in Consumer Law”
Norton Rose Fulbright L.L.P. (June 2017), online: <www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
files/ca-consumer-law-the-court-of-appeal-reviews-the-validity-of-unilateral-amend-
ment-stipulations-in-consumer-law-155212.pdf>.
307 E.C., Council Directive 91/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, [1993] OJ L 95/29 at 3(3), Annex 1(j).
308 Ibid., s. 4(1).
309 Ibid, s..4(2).
310 U.C.C., § 2 (2002).
311 Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
312 See especially Elvy, supra note 39 at 844, 874. See also Nancy Kim, ‘‘Is Contract Law
Ready for the Internet of Things?” Jotwell (5 December 2016), online: <contracts.jot-
well.com/is-contract-law-ready-for-the-internet-of-things/>.
313 See e.g.DiscountDrugMart Inc. v.DevosLtd., 2013WL5820044, 2013U.S.Dist. LEXIS
154920 (N.D. Ohio, Div. Eastern) (the court noted that a unilateral amendment
provision could result in unfair hardship);Nicosia v. Amazon.com Inc., 834F.3d 220 (2nd
Cir., 2016) (the court upheld an amended arbitration clauses in light of a prior unilateral
amendment clause).
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2) Prohibiting The Communication Of Terms And Conditions Post Contract
Formation
Second, consumer protection laws across Canada should explicitly prohibit
the communication of terms and conditions following an agreement to contract.
As observed by Elvy, an increasingly common practice business in the world of e-
commerce has become sending terms and conditions by email to consumers after
they have already and contracted for the goods or services.314 In part, this has
been a response to what Elvy called the ‘‘interface-face contracting
environment.”315 This issue — or the validity of terms and conditions
disclosed after payment and contract formation — was the subject of a recent
United States Court of Appeals decision in Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc.316 In
this case, a consumer (plaintiff) bought a vacation package from the defendant
travel company. After suffering harm during the trip, she brought an action
against the defendant company in the State of New York, against which the
defendant sought to enforce a forum selection clause listing Ontario as the agreed
upon forum. Most notably, the terms and conditions containing the forum
selection clause were sent to the consumer by email after she had already paid for
the vacation.317 The emails, themselves, did not contain the terms and
conditions, but instead contained hyperlinks to the defendant’s website where
the terms and conditions could be found.318 The Court of Appeal ruled that ‘‘[a]
tour company reasonably communicates a forum selection clause to travelers
where: (1) its promotional brochure directs the traveler’s attention to the terms
and conditions printed on the passenger ticket contract, which may be inspected
at any of the company’s offices, and (2) the ticket contract itself set forth the
clause clearly and unambiguously.”319 In other words, as long as a company’s
terms and conditions are displayed on promotional brochures or websites and
tickets or contracts explicitly stipulate the terms and conditions, they can be
found binding even if brought to the attention of consumers following payment
or the time of the formation of the contract itself.
As argued by Elvy, ‘‘[i]n no event should contract terms be disclosed to
consumers after they have already purchased goods... [and] [c]ourts should be
wary of enforcing contracts where terms are disclosed via email.”320 In the
aforementioned case, whether or not the plaintiff read or saw the terms and
conditions on the promotional brochure was immaterial, and only received them
on her ticket following payment. Even if terms and conditions are sent by email
before payment, as noted by Elvy, ‘‘there are many potential reasons that may
314 Elvy, supra note 39 at 913.
315 Elvy, supra note 39 at 846.
316 Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc., 796 F.3rd 193 (2nd Cir., 2015).
317 Ibid. at 195-96.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid. at 197-99.
320 Elvy, supra note 39 at 913.
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explain a consumer’s failure to read emailed terms. Emails may end up in a spam
folder, or delivery of the email could be delayed or blocked due to server issues
beyond the consumer’s control... consumers may [also] become over-whelmed
with the volume of such emails, which may decrease the probability that
consumers will have adequate notice of such terms.”321 More importantly,
whether or not the consumer in the case above would have changed her decision
to have purchased the ticket having seen the terms before payment is arguably
less important than the public policy and moral implications: if companies are
legally required to actively obtain the consent of consumers before the time of
purchase, then they would be — at a minimum — more deterred from
incorporating abusive terms and conditions. While consumer protection laws in
Canada do not explicitly recognize that consumers must have had an
opportunity to acquaint themselves with the terms and conditions of a
contract prior to the formation of a contract,322 EU Directive 93/13/EEC
recognizes such a right in section 3(3), Annex 1(i), which stipulates that a
contractual term is unfair and unenforceable if it ‘‘irrevocably binds the
consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.”323 Thus, European Union
laws recognize the importance of a temporal element to the negotiation and
formation of consumer contracts. A similar rule could be added into provincial
consumer protection laws across Canada to deter retailers from communicating
their terms and conditions by email after contract formation and to encourage
retailers to use ‘‘I agree” drop-down terms and conditions online. This would be
a small but incremental step for protecting consumers against — what Elvy
described as — ‘‘the increased levels of information asymmetry and the growing
distance between consumers, contract terms, and the contract formation
process.”324
3) Prohibiting The Waiver Of Consumer’s Right To Bring Class Action
Proceedings
Third, consumer protection laws across Canada should explicitly prohibit
waiving consumers’ right to bring class action proceedings under the contract.
Note that while some provinces have already adopted such rules, they have not
been universally adopted across all the provinces. For example, in Ontario and
Quebec, sections 8(1) and 11(1) of their respective consumer protection acts325
prohibit the use of waivers for class action proceedings:
321 Ibid.
322 See e.g. CPA 2002, supra note 125 (Ontario).
323 Council Directive 91/13/EEC, supra note 307, s 3(3), Annex 1(i).
324 Elvy, supra note 39 at 846. For a more radical proposition, see Robert A. Hillman,
‘‘Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire” (2006) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (contemplating whether websites and e-
commerce retailers should be required to disclose their terms and conditions publically
online).
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A consumer may commence a proceeding on behalf of members of a
class under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 or may become a member
of a class in such a proceeding in respect of a dispute in the consumer
agreement or a related agreement that purports to prevent or has the
effect of preventing the consumer from commencing or becoming a
member of a class proceeding.326
Saskatchewan is the only other Canadian province that prohibits class action
waivers under its consumer protection laws.327 However, no such rules exist in
the consumer protection or class proceeding acts of other provinces and
territories — including their associated regulations. For example, see the
consumer protections statutes of British Columbia,328 Alberta,329 Manitoba,330
Newfoundland and Labrador,331 Prince Edward Island,332 Nova Scotia,333
Yukon,334 the Northwest Territories,335 and Nunavut.336 Overall, the majority of
Canadian provinces have thus not adopted rules prohibiting class action waivers.
Prohibiting class action waivers in consumer contracts is particularly
important for several reasons. Most notably, given that the objects of are
consumer contract is typically of low monetary value (e.g. monthly cellphone
bills of $40 per month or banking transaction fees of $1-2 each) and considering
that most infractions are concerned with only a portion of the total value of a
contract, individual consumers are not reasonably expected to enforce their
rights over minor infractions.337 Indeed, the time it would take to enforce those
rights in court and costs associated with proceedings would most likely outweigh
potential benefits of enforcing those rights. Nonetheless, this does not mean that
minor infractions by retailers or service providers on individual rights do not
325 CPA 2002, supra note 125, s. 8(1) (Ontario); Consumer Protection Act, C.Q.L.R. c. P-
40.1, s. 11(1) (Quebec) (‘‘Any stipulation that obliges the consumer to refer a dispute to
arbitration, that restricts the consumer’s right to go before a court, in particular by
prohibiting the consumer from bringing a class action, or that deprives the consumer of
the right to be a member of a group bringing a class action is prohibited”).
326 CPA 2002, supra note 125, s. 8(1) (Ontario).
327 The Consumer Protection and Business Act, S.S. 2014, c. C-30.2, s. 101.
328 BusinessPractices andConsumerProtectionAct, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2;ClassProceedingsAct,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50.
329 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-26.3;Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-
16.5
330 Consumer Protection Act, C.C.S.M. c. C-200; Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c C-130.
331 Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, S.N.L. 2009, c. C-31.1; Class Actions
Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. C-18.1.
332 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-19.
333 Consumer ProtectionAct, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 92;Class Proceedings Act, S.N.S. 2007, c. 28.
334 Consumers Protection Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 40;
335 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-17.
336 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T.(Nu) 1988, c. C-17.
337 See Elvy, supra note 39 at 907.
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amount to major infractions when considered collectively. Therefore, as a matter
of public policy, class action proceedings are essential procedural tools holding
companies accountable where they might not have otherwise been held
accountable by individual claimants. Class action waivers are especially
problematic because, as noted by Elvy, ‘‘consumers routinely fail to read
contract terms.”338 Elvy cited one survey in 2007 that found that less than 1% of
users access a company’s terms and conditions online and that ‘‘of the few users
who did access the company’s terms and conditions, half of the users’ access
lasted for less than thirty seconds and ninety percent of users spent less than two
minutes reviewing the terms and conditions.”339 In short, in a modern
contracting environment where consumers almost always fail to read terms
and conditions and one that is characterized by unprecedented levels of
information asymmetry and contracting distance — especially considering new
interface-free platforms — it would be unconscionable economically, logistically,
and morally to allow parties with so much bargaining power to waive consumers’
right to bring class actions.
4) Prohibiting Self-Executory Performance Without Constructive Notice
Finally, consumer protection laws across Canada should explicitly prohibit
self-executory performance of consumer contracts without constructive notice.
As discussed in Part 2 (B), there are already a number of retailers who are
moving towards automated and interface-free contracting models, whereby
‘‘robotic devices have the capacity not only to inform consumers that a product
is running low, but also to purchase replacement products directly from
companies without consumers actively participating.”340 For example, Brita
water filters are designed to detect that its filter has been used to full capacity and
to automatically order replacement filters on Amazon.341 Under this or other
similar arrangements — such as Amazon’s Dash Replenishment Service
(‘‘DRS”)342 — consumers will be presented with terms and conditions at the
initial time of purchasing the product and will subsequently be asked to consent
online to terms and conditions for setting-up automatic replenishing. However,
consumers might not be presented with terms and conditions before each
subsequent renewal or purchase. As argued by Elvy:
Where a consumer is not provided with a contract terms prior to each
successive order placed using an IOT device, or fails to understand the
impact of such terms when they are provided, the consumer should not
automatically be deemed to have manifested assent or unequivocally
accepted a company’s terms and conditions.”343
338 Ibid. at 874.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid. at 843.
341 Ibid. at 840-41.
342 Ibid.
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Such an arrangement could be problematic for a number of reasons. For
example, if — as promised by members of the innovation communities and
demonstrated early by companies like Amazon — self-executory performance
contracts become widely adopted, it would unduly force consumers to keep track
of all of their self-executory arrangements for different products and with
multiple companies. Consumers would have to be extremely vigilant to cancel
any contracts or unsubscribe to the automatic replenishing feature for products
or services no longer needed (at the risk of being billed each month). On a related
note, consumer preferences constantly change and platforms (such as the Brita
filter) may themselves break or become obsolete thereby eliminating the need for
more filters. These arrangements also raise legal questions about automatic
successive purchases, like how they would be treated if a retailer exercised a
unilateral amendment or changed the product.344
This issue is particularly challenging for consumer protection laws because
too much interference from the legislature (in the form of restrictions on self-
executing performance) would run against the envisioned benefits of an interface-
free contracting mechanism. A viable solution must therefore balance the
concerns for consumer protection with desires for promoting innovation and
commercial efficiency. On this note, I propose that provincial consumer
protection laws address self-executory contracts using the doctrine of
constructive notice. Rather than obligating retailers to obtain the explicit
consent of consumers before each reorder (e.g. by clicking ‘‘I agree” to terms and
conditions online), consumer protection laws should obligate retailers to notify
consumers within a reasonable time that they will re-execute the purchase unless
the consumers cancel the reorder online or by another means of communication
before the purchase is executed. This kind of arrangement would allow the
retailer and consumer to retain the benefit of self-executory deals, but would give
consumers an opportunity to consider — without requiring any action on the
part of the consumer — whether or not they agree to purchase additional
products or services. Currently, no provincial consumer protection laws in
Canada explicitly address self-executing contracts and the proposed amendments
would best be characterized as ‘‘unconscionable” and ‘‘unfair practices” giving
the consumers a right to rescind their contracts if no such notice was given by the
retailer.
B) Embracing Generalist Equitable Statutes Not Limited To Specialized
Contracts
Second, to address concerns about growing information asymmetry and
contract distance, changes could also be made by incorporating equitable
principles into more generalist statutes not limited to specialized contracts. While
in the section above, I outlined four ideas for modernizing provincial consumer
343 Ibid. at 879.
344 Ibid. at 841.
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protections statutes through the channel of unconscionability, in practice, they
would be limited to consumer contracts and would not resolve technology-
related issues for more sophisticated parties. Accordingly, each province’s
Electronic Commerce Act could also be modernized to account for technology-
related issues more broadly whenever electronic agents are used in the
contracting process. Currently, most Electronic Commerce acts recognize a
limited set of circumstances that would render an electronic transaction
unenforceable. For example, section 21 of Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act
only recognizes ‘‘material error” as an equitable defense and attaches stringent
conditions for evoking the defense:
An electronic transaction between an individual and another person’s
electronic agent is not enforceable by the other person if,
(a) the individual makes a material error in electronic informa-
tion or an electronic document used in the transaction;
(b) the electronic agent does not give the individual an oppor-
tunity to prevent or correct the error;
(c) on becoming aware of the error, the individual promptly
notifies the other person; and
(d) in a case where consideration is received as a result of the
error, the individual,
(i) returns or destroys the consideration in accordance with the
other person’s instructions or, if there are no instructions,
deals with the consideration in a reasonable manner, and
(ii) does not benefit materially.345
However, as discussed in Part 2 (B), the use of electronic agents for
contracting introduces issues that may not be adequately covered by electronic
commerce legislation. For example, two sophisticated parties can use electronic
agents for ‘‘contract analytics” functions, which use AI to review past contracts
and standard terms between parties and approximate a single standard
document.346 If these technologies become widely adopted by commercial
parties for their cost-saving and efficiency benefits — as noted by Betts and Jaep
— representatives of the companies will further separate themselves from the
contract formation process and would be less cognisant of precise terms and their
implications.347 If this were the case, it would make sense to include other
equitable defenses like rectification in electronic commerce acts, rendering
unenforceable contracts or terms where, as recently noted by the Supreme Court
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Fairmont Hotels Inc., contracting parties can
rectify written agreements if they demonstrate a ‘‘common continuing intention
in regard to a particular provision or aspect of the agreement.”348 It wrote:
345 ECA, supra note 130, s. 21 (Ontario).
346 Betts & Jaep, supra note 210 at 227.
347 Ibid.
348 Fairmont Hotels, supra note 25 at para 27.
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If one finds that, in regard to a particular point, the parties were in
agreement up to the moment when they executed their formal
instrument, and the formal instrument does not conform with that
common agreement, then [the] court has jurisdiction to rectify,
although it may be that there was, until the formal agreement was
executed, no concluded and binding contract between the parties.349
This recommendation recognizes that — as pointed out by Xavier
Beauchamp-Tremblay and others350 — there is currently a major gap between
lawyers’ legal competences and technological competences and that there exists a
risk that technology-facilitated contracts will fail to capture parties’ genuine
intentions. While the Supreme Court of Canada has recently ruled on
rectification in Fairmont and Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General)351 — as argued above — there are benefits to including
equitable principles in statutes rather than merely recognizing them in common
law jurisprudence, such as the efficiency of pleadings, deterrence, and making
rights clear and accessible to the public. Finally, depending on the nature and
magnitude of issues that come to light from the onset of new technologies,
electronic commerce acts could also foreseeably be modernized to include
equitable principles on issues of capacity to contract, unconscionability, and
estoppel, among other things.
C) Making Legislative Reform Quicker And More Adaptable To
Technological Change
Third, if statutes are going to play a useful role in resolving technology-
related contractual disputes, as asserted by Kit Barker, there will be a ‘‘need to
maintain a healthy, adaptive system.”352 By their very nature, courts and the
common law system are more adaptive than legislatures when delineating new
duties or modernizing older doctrines. In part, this stems from the fact that
courts do not have to undergo lengthy legislative processes and they hear cases
on the most current issues. Accordingly, moving the equitable function to
statutory regimes must be done carefully as it risks creating ‘‘a top-down,
centralised system of regulations that is unsuited to the job of keeping pace with
the evolution of the complex system.” To mitigate this risk, legislatures should —
as proposed by Henry E. Smith — fulfill their equitable function by favouring
broader, goal-oriented standards of conduct allowing courts to interpret such
standards ex post and in light of unique circumstances.353 This is consistent with
349 Ibid.
350 Xavier Beauchamp-Tremblay, ‘‘HowFar areLawyers fromDrafting SmartContracts?”
Slaw (3 August 2017), online: <www.slaw.ca/2017/08/03/how-far-are-lawyers-from-
drafting-smart-contracts/>.
351 Jean Coutu, supra note 25.
352 Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System,” supra note 38 at 27.
353 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law,” supra note 79 at 176-87.
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the smart regulation trends discussed in Part 2 (B)(c) of this article. Warren
Swain predicts that under such a system, ‘‘doctrinal shifts and greater complexity
of contractual relations may make context more significant”354 and Arvind and
Gray likewise predict that courts will likely ‘‘focus on the needs of complex, high-
value litigation.”355 To be useful, legislatures will have to keep pace with
emerging technologies and continuously monitor trends in contract formation.
As discussed above, self-executory contracts and the promised interface-free
environment might present novel challenges unaddressed with by current
legislation. More importantly, as argued by James Beniger in The Control
Revolution, ‘‘there is a recurrent failure of past generations to appreciate the
major societal transformations of their own eras.”356 He also noted that new
technologies rapidly breed newer technologies, meaning that legislatures must be
proactive to anticipate change:
Each new technological innovation extends the processes that sustain
life, thereby increasing the need for control and hence for improved
control technology. This is why technology appears autonomously to
beget technology in general and why, as argued here, innovations in
matter and energy processing create the need for further innovation in
information-processing and communication technologies.357
D) Promoting Technical And Equitable Literacy In Law School And
Professional Curricula
Finally, in light of the sections above, there is a need to promote technical
literacy and to study equitable principles and reasoning in law school and
professional curricula. First, as asserted by Gary Marchant, ‘‘there will be
winners and losers among lawyers who do and do not uptake AI [and] unless
private practice lawyers start to engage with new technology, they are not going
to be relevant even to their clients.”358 Indeed, technology is bound to impact
contracts and the law more generally, whether or not individual lawyers, judges,
or scholars are in favour of the changes. Marc Lauritsen similarly asserted:
If you think the legal work being done in your shop can’t be improved
by emerging technologies, you’re wrong. If you think you can get away
with ignoring these developments indefinitely, you’re also wrong. You
may not be shoved aside by a machine, but you could well be displaced
354 Warren Swain, ‘‘‘The Steaming Lungs of a Pigeon’: Predicting the Direction of
Australian Contract Law in the Next 25 Years” in Barker, Fairweather & Grantham,
eds., Private Law in the 21st Century, supra note 14 at 100.
355 Arvind & Gray, ‘‘The Limits of Technocracy,” supra note 144 at 239.
356 Beniger, The Control Revolution, supra note 36 at 2.
357 Ibid. at 10 [emphasis added].
358 Gary Marchant, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Legal Practice” (Fall 2017)
14:1 Scitech Lawyer 20 at 23.
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by another lawyer, or entrepreneur, who makes better use of machines
than you.359
However, these changes should not be feared, and most acknowledge that the
demand for human lawyers, judges, and jurists will not be replaced by emerging
technologies360 since they are ‘‘most effective when combined with human
expertise.”361 Lauritsen argues ‘‘[l]awyers should emphasize natural human
advantages while also embracing artificial intelligence platforms.”362
This is indeed one reason why the study of emerging technology in the law
pairs well with the study of equitable principles and reasoning. As observed by
Edwina Rissland, although ‘‘some might be concerned that the use of AI models
will somehow trivialize legal reasoning by making it seem simple, undermine the
importance of lawyers and judges by relegating them to the role of mere users of
systems... or dehumanize us by describing intelligent behaviour in well-defined
terms... AI research shows just the opposite: The more we understand human
reasoning, the more we marvel at its richness and flexibility, the more questions
we ask as we try to understand its workings, and the more we require of a
computer program exhibiting intelligence.”363 The study of equity, on the other
hand, focuses on the ‘‘spirit rather than the letter of the law [and] lends the sys-
tem of the law a great deal of its openness.”364 In short, the study of equity is one
of an inherently human character, placing utmost concern for broader standards
of conduct such as the fairness of exchange. Unfortunately, as observed by
Leonard Rotman, ‘‘[w]hen [t]he desire for certainty is combined with the
decreased emphasis on substantive equity within Canadian and American law
schools, equitable doctrines such as fiduciary duty that emphasize abstract
principles rather than more easily discernible and predictable rules have struggled
to maintain their traditional roles.”365 The problem with such an approach is
that, ‘‘despite its struggle towards achieving certainty, [it often ignores that] the
law actually benefits from a certain amount of fogginess.”366 Jeff Berryman, for
example, advocates for studying broader equitable maxims in law school
curricula, which may no longer hold weight as rules of law or equity (although he
refers to maxims’ ‘‘strong instinct for survival”367 in Supreme Court rulings), but
help ‘‘to differentiate equity’s distinctive methodology from other forms of
359 Lauritsen, ‘‘Marketing Real Lawyers,” supra note 13 at 69.
360 See e.g. Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Law,” supra note 13 at 1980.
361 David Buser, ‘‘AI Automation Starts to Transform Legal Profession” (blog) Computer
Weekly (15 June 2017), online: .
362 Marchant, supra note 358 at 68.
363 Rissland, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Law,” supra note 13 at 1980.
364 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 177.
365 Rotman, ‘‘Fusion of Law and Equity,” supra note 4 at 500.
366 Ibid.
367 Berryman, ‘‘Equity’s Maxims,” supra note 8 at 185. See also Smith, ‘‘Fusing the
Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 185.
TECHNOLOGY, DISPUTES AND THE FUTURE OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 197
exercising discretion... [which in turn allows] a historically legitimate opening to
explicitly infuse parts of law amenable to equity’s jurisdiction with moral and
ethical values.”368 Indeed, Henry E. Smith remarked: ‘‘if one reviews the
principal Canadian texts in these areas, the word ‘maxim’ is rarely, if ever,
uttered.”369 I propose — like Berryman and Smith — that law school curricula
should explore equitable maxims not for their modern authoritative or
persuasive merits, but rather to teach students about the inherently human
principles of justice and fairness that have historically had a tremendous impact
on the common law tradition. Such teachings, coupled with the promotion of
interdisciplinary collaboration (e.g. encouraging law students to partner with
students in computer-science related fields for projects), could, together, go a
long way in helping to lawyers ‘‘emphasize natural human advantages while also
embracing [technical] platforms.”370
5. CONCLUSION
There are a number of legitimate reasons to be excited about the application
of new technologies for interface-free contracting. Unfortunately, each of those
reasons is conversely associated with certain risks for both contractors and
contractees. In this article, I argued that an ‘‘equitable” conception of modern
contract law, understood by the likes of DiMatteo and others ‘‘not as a mere
system of rules, but of rules tempered by standards and principles — a system not
tied to static doc-trine... [but] recogniz[ing] that contractual relationships are a
self-transforming cultural activity that should reflect the goodness of overarching
cultural norms”371 — is well suited for tempering some of the undesirable
contractual consequences brought on by new technologies like blockchain,
artificial intelligence, and smart contracts. Though, as noted by Kit Barker,
‘‘[t]he extent to which private law can and will shift to accommodate these calls
for greater subjectivity... is an intricate matter.”372 At the crux of the exercise is
the question ‘‘how properly to balance the respective auto-nomy interests when
determining which forms of persons as human agents exercising real dignity and
choice, without allowing itself to affirm the view that life is ‘all about me’ and
never about anyone else”373 or balancing concerns for substantive and
procedural fairness in modern contracts. Accordingly, I proposed four ideas
for trying to offset some of those unwanted consequences:
368 Ibid.
369 Smith, ‘‘Fusing the Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 185.
370 Marchant, supra note 358 at 68.
371 DiMatteo,Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 289. See also Smith, ‘‘Fusing the
Equitable Function,” supra note 79 at 177-85.
372 Barker, ‘‘Private Law as a Complex System,” supra note 38 at 8.
373 Ibid. at 9.
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(1) inserting increasingly relevant equitable principles into statute; thereby (a)
prohibiting the use of unilateral amendment provisions in consumer
contracts, (b) prohibiting the communication of terms and conditions after
contract formation in consumer contracts, (c) prohibiting the use of waivers
to prevent consumers from bringing class action proceedings; and (d)
prohibiting the self-execution of contractual performance without construc-
tive notice;
(2) embracing generalist equitable statutes not limited to specialized contracts;
(3) making legislative reform quicker and more adaptable to technological
change; and finally,
(4) promoting technical and equitable literacy in law school and professional
curricula.
More than anything, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the future
application of technology to contracts. The corrective application of equitable
principles offers a viable alternative to address uncertainties and imbalances in
future contractual disputes.374
374 DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts, supra note 10 at 289.
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